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U.S. POLICY TOWARD INDOCHINA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 2, 1989

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MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1989

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD–419, Hon. Alan Cranston (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Cranston, Robb, Helms, and Murkowski.

Senator CRANSTON. We now open this session of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

This is the second hearing in 3 months that this subcommittee has held on the situation in Indochina. Our hearing last June 12 focused on proposals for United States assistance to Cambodia. Then, we discussed in depth the very controversial and, I would add, continued contentious issue of United States lethal assistance the non-Communist resistance known as NCR in camps in Thailand.

Much has happened since that earlier hearing. Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen held a third meeting held by an international conference at which 18 countries participated in Paris and lasting from July 30 to August 30. That conference ended without an agreement, and on September 21 the last Vietnamese troops left Cambodia.

Now, Cambodia and the world appear to be braced for another bloody onslaught of civil war, the beginnings of a fourth Indochina war as the dry season begins.

Some might suggest that this is not America's problem. Instead, they would see it as a Vietnamese problem, or a Chinese problem, or a Soviet problem, or an ASEAN problem, but not ours. But turning our backs on it will not make it go away, nor does it make it any less an issue for American foreign policy.

Yes, our influence there may not be as great as elsewhere in the world, but our interests are not any less engaged. In fact, bringing peace in Indochina is central to sustaining peace and prosperity elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Certainly, this is a major factor in ASEAN's role in the Cambodian peace process. Past former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke observed in his earlier testimony before this committee, "We have a continuing interest in the stability, coherence, and economic development of ASEAN and our other friends in the Asian and Pacific region."

If we are unable to play a role in Indochina, others will do so, diminishing American influence throughout a region in which our presence is already being challenged by the Chinese, the Soviets, and the Japanese.

This is a political argument for an American policy, but there is also a moral argument. Can we stand by on the sidelines while the genocidal Khmer Rouge attempt once again to seize power? Is there no role for us to play, except as an incidental arms supplier to one faction in the civil war?

So far, U.S. policy has been morally bankrupt. During the Paris Peace Conference, we found ourselves in the position of backing Prince Sihanouk's insistence on including the Khmer Rouge in an interim government, not because we supported the Khmer Rouge, but because we supported Prince Sihanouk.

Richard Cohen commented on this yesterday in the Washington Post, and I cannot resist reading two sentences from his column. He wrote:

> Can you imagine that following World War II, Hitler and the remnants of the Nazi Party had fled to the Black Forest and continued to fight the Russians. since the Russians were our enemy too, we decided to support forces in Germany that were aligned with Hitler.

That rings down to this present situation, I think, very, very directly. As Secretary Baker stated in Paris on July 30, on the one hand "the United States strongly believes that the Khmer Rouge should play no role in Cambodia's future," but on the other hand, again quoting Baker, "we are prepared, however, to support Prince Sihanouk should he deem it necessary to accept the inclusion of all Khmer factions in an interim coalition, or an interim authority."

I say that that policy wobbles like jello. Sihanouk was, as Assistant Secretary Solomon observed in testimony before the House Asia Subcommittee on September 14, "our horse." Perhaps he is our horse, perhaps we just think he is our horse. He certainly is not the only one, or the only means to an end. Nor is it, I would argue, the proper moral basis on which to construct an American foreign policy.

Congressman Solarz, at his hearing, made an interesting analogy which bears repeating at length:

> In Afghanistan we take the position that political settlement requires the exclusion not only of Najibullah but of all representatives of the PDPA on the grounds that they have been complicit in the murder of up to 1 million of their own countrymen which resulted from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and they are not fit for participation in any kind of political settlement.
>
> In the case of Cambodia, we seem to be taking the position that because Prince Sihanouk prefers it, that the Khmer Rouge should be included in an interim arrangement even though they were responsible for the murder of up to 2 million Cambodians.

This moral inconsistency does not provide the basis for an American foreign policy. "Morality and practicality require a new approach," as the New York Times editorialized on September 27.

What this new approach should be is the subject of this hearing. We do not expect to find the answer, but to provoke further discussion. Some have already suggested new approaches.

Congressman Chet Atkins in the Washington Post on September 27 recommended diplomatic recognition of Vietnam, "not," as he

writes, "to diminish the importance of outstanding divisive issues between us, but to improve the chances of resolving them."

Congressman Jim Leach the same day called on the United Nations to deploy an international peacekeeping force and suggests and international tribunal to try Pol Pot.

Others suggest wearily that we stay the course, supporting the non-Communist resistance with lethal assistance until all sides have tested their strength in the battlefield. To me, that suggests an unholy complicity in a people's destruction. What end is served by American support for a civil war in Cambodia? Do we give guns to Sihanouk so he can combine forces with Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in attacking Phnom Penh?

Some would suggest that the non-Communists need guns to survive, ignoring that they have survived without such weapons for 10 years in camps inside Thailand. Will they survive any better with guns, or become a target for attack? Who defends the women and children caught in refugee camps in between?

Today, I hope we can explore further these issues and themes. This is the second step in what I hope will be an effort to engage the Congress, the administration and the American people in a reexamination of our policy toward Indochina and an effort at last to contribute to peace, prosperity, and ultimately democracy in that region.

We have a distinguished group of witnesses. I welcome you all. We will begin with Senator Bob Kerrey from Nebraska, whose distinguished service in Vietnam is well known as is his concern for the region's future.

He will be followed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Lambertson, who has participated in the formation of American policy toward Indochina through two administrations.

After Mr. Lambertson, we will have two public panels. The first will include three distinguished Cambodian Americans, Dith Pran, Haing Ngor, and Kassie Neou, who recently returned from visiting Cambodia under the auspices of the Cambodian Documentation Center.

We will conclude with a second panel of Frederick Brown, formerly a staff member with this committee and author of a recent study for the Council on Foreign Relations entitled "Second Chance, the United States and Indochina in the 1990's," and Richard Childress, most recently with the National Security Council and now a private consultant, and Ken Conboy, a researcher on Southeast Asia for the Heritage Foundation.

We now go to our first witness, and Bob, I welcome you to this hearing. I am eager to hear your thoughts.

[The prepared statement of Senator Cranston follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CRANSTON

We now open this session of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

This is the second hearing in 3 months that this subcommittee has held on the situation in Indochina. Our hearing last June 12 focused on "Proposals for United States Assistance To Cambodia." Then we discussed in depth the very controversial—and, I would add, continued contentious—issue of United States lethal assistance to the non-Communist resistance (NCR) encamped in Thailand.

Much has happened since that earlier hearing: Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen held a third meeting followed by an international conference in which 18 countries

participated in Paris and lasting from July 30 to August 30—that conference ended without an agreement; and on September 21 the last Vietnamese troops left Cambodia.

Now Cambodia and the world appears to be braced for another bloody onslaught of civil war—the beginnings of a fourth Indochina war—as the dry season begins.

Some might suggest that this is not America's problem. Instead, they would see it as a Vietnamese problem, a Chinese problem, a Soviet problem, or an ASEAN problem. Not our's.

But turning our backs on it will not make it go away. Nor does it make it any less an issue for American foreign policy. Yes, our influence there may not be as great as elsewhere in the world, but our interests are not any less engaged. In fact, bringing peace to Indochina is central to sustaining peace and prosperity elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Certainly this is a major factor in ASEAN's role in the Cambodia peace process.

As former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke observed in his earlier testimony before this committee, "We have a continuing interest in the stability, coherence, and economic development of ASEAN and our other friends in the Asian and Pacific region."

If we are unable to play a role in Indochina, others will do so, diminishing American influence throughout a region in which our presence is already being challenged by the Chinese, the Soviets, and the Japanese.

This is a political argument for an American policy. But there is also a moral argument. Can we stand by the sidelines while the genocidal Khmer Rouge attempt once again to seize power? Is there no role for us to play except as an incidental arms supplier to one faction in a civil war?

So far, U.S. policy has been morally bankrupt. During the Paris Peace Conference we found ourselves in the position of backing Prince Sihanouk's instance insistence on including the Khmer Rouge in an interim government, not because we supported the Khmer Rouge but because we supported Prince Sihanouk.

As Secretary Baker stated in Paris on July 30, on the one hand, "The United States strongly believes that the Khmer Rouge should play no role in Cambodia's future" but, on the other hand, "We are prepared, however, to support Prince Sihanouk should he deem it necessary to accept the inclusion of all Khmer factions in an interim coalition or an interim authority."

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"In the case of Cambodia, we seem to be taking the position that because Prince Sihanouk prefers it, that the Khmer Rouge should be included in an interim arrangement even though they were responsible for the murder of up to 2 million Cambodians."

This moral inconsistency does not provide the basis for an American foreign policy. "Morality and practicality require a new approach," as the New York Times editorialized on September 27.

What this new approach should be is the subject of this hearing. We do not expect to find the answer but to provoke further discussion. Some have already suggested new approaches. Congressman Chet Atkins in a Washington Post article on September 27 recommended diplomatic recognition of Vietnam, "not," as he writes, "to diminish the importance of outstanding divisive issues between us, but to improve the chances of resolving them." Congressman Jim Leach in the New York Times the same day called on the United Nations to deploy an international peacekeeping forces and suggests an international tribunal to try Pol Pot.

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Even as we discuss continuing on our present course toward war, there is movement on the ground. Thai Prime Minister Chatchai stated in late August, according to an interview in the Bangkok Post, that "Thailand will open more border points and encourage more trade with Cambodia after the scheduled Vietnamese withdrawal from that country. * * *" Singaporean engineers reportedly are building hotels in Phnom Penh.

Economics seems to be overwhelming political concerns. Perhaps that is where the solution lies. Rather than supporting a quadripartite solution, siding with the Khmer Rouge, we should be supporting the Thai approach of influencing people with capitalism not guns, holding out to Hun Sen the promise of a major multilateral aid initiative for Cambodia if he would agree to share power with the non-Communist resistance in an interim government leading to internationally supervised elections.

Again, some might say that the Chinese would never accept this because of their support for the Khmer Rouge: They would continue pouring in weapons, financing war until the Khmer Rouge are included in a settlement. What does including them mean? Well, we know what it means: It means genocide. Who would knowingly welcome a psychopathic murderer to spend the night in his home?

The Chinese also support Prince Sihanouk. Is it their desire to see an independent, stable, and neutral Cambodia on the Vietnamese border or is it their desire to promote the Lebanonization of Cambodia so that the disorder on the Vietnamese border distracts Hanoi from its own search for stability and prosperity? If it is the former objective, then there is the basis for a common cause with the Chinese. But if it is the latter, then let us explore their policy for what it is: Another sign that the Chinese Government is devoted to the Machiavellian abuse of power.

A Washington Post editorial of September 27, accurately summed our present bankrupt policy:

"The United States still rejects Hun Sen and clings to the flaky Sihanouk, notwithstanding the latter's Khmer Rouge infatuation. It leans only gently on China and the Thais. It refuses to let the U.N. observe Vietnam's troop withdrawal, lest Hanoi take diplomatic profit. It shifts and hardens its conditions for improving relations with Vietnam, undercutting those in Hanoi who hoped withdrawal would let Vietnam rejoin the international economy. Rather than deal head on with the crisis of imminent civil war—by pouring in international monitors, for instance, or by working harder to restrict arms supplies—it keeps demanding an all-or-nothing 'comprehensive statement.' This is the formula for more war."

Today, I hope we can explore further these issues and themes. This is the second step in what I hope will be an effort to engage the Congress, the administration, and the American people in a reexamination of our policy toward Indochina and an effort at last to contribute to peace, prosperity, and ultimately democracy in that region.

We have a distinguished group of witnesses. I welcome you all. We will begin with Senator Bob Kerrey from Nebraska whose distinguished service in Vietnam is well known as is his concern for the region's future. He will be followed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Lambertson who has participated in the formation of American policy toward Indochina through tow administrations. After Mr. Lambertson, we will have two public panels. The first will include three distinguished Cambodian Americans, Dith Pran, Haing Ngor, and Kassie Neou, who recently returned from visiting Cambodia under the auspices of the Cambodian Documentation Center. We will conclude with a second panel of Frederick Brown, formerly a staff member with this committee and author of a recent study for the Council on Foreign Relations entitled "Second Chance, the United States and Indochina in the 1990's"; Richard Childress, most recently with the National Security Council and now a private consultant, and Ken Conboy, a researcher on Southeast Asia for the Heritage Foundation.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT KERREY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

Senator KERREY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your giving me this opportunity to testify and I would simply, at the beginning ask unanimous consent that I could submit the full text of my remarks to the record.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes. It will appear.

Senator KERREY. I believe that we have let the political ground—that is, the political debate about Indochina—lie fallow for too long. I also believe that for too long we have focused our attention only upon the Vietnam war, and in particular upon that war's impact upon Americans.

Your hearings today enable us to turn our attention to that which produced the war in the first place, and that is the freedom and the well-being of the Indochinese people. We should resist quick and easy answers in Cambodia. This is not a horse race. It is not simply a task of choosing the right side or the right person with the perfect credentials. We do not control the internal events in Cambodia. Policies that are built upon a belief that we have a simple choice to make will fail.

Our first question, Mr. Chairman, I believe should be to determine why we should do anything, particularly if the conclusion is that we will need to spend hundreds of millions of dollars.

I do not have to remind you that it is possible for us to fail and thus to waste our money. The possibility of failure, however, is not the only reason that we need a solid foundation for helping the people of another nation. We must also address the fact that it might be better for us to spend the money here at home, where our own inner cities are beginning to resemble those of a developing country. In our own cities, at least, we stand a much better chance of doing the right thing.

So, I begin by trying to answer the question of what is our interest in Cambodia, and what is our justification for action? Do we, first of all, have a strategic interest in Cambodia? Is that why we seem determined to act?

Mr. Chairman, I believe, having already lost the ports of Danang and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and the submarine base of Kampong Son to the Soviet Union, it is difficult for me to justify United States help because we are afraid of losing much more. Thus, while I have not concluded that our strategic interest in Cambodia is zero, I would not cite it as the basis of United States policy.

The second question I would ask is this: Is our response a consequence of lingering guilt about the war in Vietnam? Do we feel a responsibility for destabilization of the Cambodian Government that appeared to enable Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge to overthrow Lon Nol just a few weeks before Vietnam itself fell to the communists in 1975? Or is it the terrible knowledge that we did nothing while the killing fields were taking place?

These reasons, the validity of which I would personally challenge, should be completely discarded. The frequency of foreign policy error increases in direct proportion to the level of domestic guilt. We should not blunder again because we oversimplified the scene in Indochina with naive emotions.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would cite two personal reasons and national reasons to justify our involvement in Cambodia. The first and most important is the freedom and peace of the Khmer people. The guides used by us should be the same three things that have served us so well in the past: human rights, democratic freedoms, and open markets.

The second reason for involvement is that it will force us to resolve conflicts external to Cambodia. If we hope to help the Khmer prevent the killing fields again, let alone achieve the more difficult objectives of political and economic freedom, it will be necessary to settle great power conflicts.

The people of Cambodia are about to be trampled by the elephants of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. The United States could help prevent this and in the process increase the stability of all of Southeast Asia.

Another good beginning point for us is to understand that the opposite of war is not peace. Rather, the opposite of war is a government structure that permits the settlement of conflict in a manner that makes war unnecessary.

In addition, it would be worthwhile if we agree to leave our domestic disagreements at the water's edge. Rather than simply criticizing Secretary of State Baker for failure in Paris, we should give him full credit for attending a summit, even though the potential for not getting an agreement was great. We should permit ourselves to stay the course so that our adversaries and our friends understand that we do not intend to tire of this quest for peace.

If the lack of agreement in Paris surprised us, this is because we fail to understand the Cambodians and their dilemma. We see the simple choice between the genocidal Khmer Rouge and the Hanoi-dominated PRK which delivered Cambodia from the killing fields.

Having seen the move, "The Killing Fields," and subscribing to the lesser of evils theory, there is a tendency to rush to support the PRK. Sihanouk, on the other hand, looked the other way.

Sihanouk may be mercurial and he may be unpredictable, but he is not stupid. He is also not bloody handed. He sees in Hun Sen and the Heng Samrin government a people composed of individuals who participated in the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge.

He knows that Hun Sen is not the savior which many Americans believe him to be. Sihanouk is first of all Cambodian. He sees a bigger threat to Cambodia from Vietnam than he sees from the Khmer Rouge, and he knows that the PRK government is dominated by Vietnamese interests.

He knows that Vietnam's withdrawal is only partially complete. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese settlers have moved into eastern Cambodia, and Vietnamese infiltration into the PRK military is substantial.

Cambodian antipathy to Vietnam cannot be ignored or underestimated. It is founded on centuries of warfare, bloody conquest, and bad faith. It pervades Cambodian history, folklore, and art. This antipathy may not be valid in 1989, but it is real nonetheless, and 30 days in Paris did little to dispel it.

Did the Paris talks fail? If you expected 30 days of talks to stop 20 years of war and terror in Cambodia, they failed to do that.

Most observers agree that Paris offered but a slim chance of peace. That chance, however, was taken.

Similar talks in Geneva in 1954 and in 1962, and Paris in 1973, sought to prevent civil war in Southeast Asia by imposing solutions reasonable to Western diplomats. The warring factions in those talks saw only the seeds of more war in those agreements. They signed reluctantly, and tragedy was written in our history books.

I am encouraged that the old path was not followed in the recent talks. I was glad, as well, and in particular, to see Cambodians put at the center of things. They were given the opportunity to find common ground under international oversight. The world listened to them and stood ready to assist in any peaceful solution they devised.

Recrimination now over what might have come out of Paris is not productive. The quadripartite and tripartite suggestions were both rejected by Cambodians. We stood ready to support either one. The question today is not what might have been, but where do we go today with U.S. policy?

Current United States policy on Cambodia is dominated by a recent Senate vote which opened the door to covertly aiding Sihanouk and his forces in Paris. But in Paris we saw bumbling and disarray. We did not see Sihanouk's ability to bring Cambodian factions together under a banner of nationalism.

It is difficult to conclude, after watching Sihanouk's performance in Paris, that lethal aid to the non-Communist resistance has any chance of bringing peace and democracy to Cambodia.

Lethal aid could, however, have fatal consequences for the Cambodian people. It could have dangerous implications of the emerging balance of power in southeast Asia. Any country supporting the Sihanouk/Khmer Rouge alliance must bear full responsibility if the killing fields return.

It will not be enough to say we thought a victorious Khmer Rouge would deviate into truth.

U.S. policy must be reevaluated after what we saw in Paris. The American people deserve a full and an open debate before committing U.S. forces to the Khmer Rouge side of a Cambodian civil war. I do not think they would stand for it.

We as a nation, overestimate our influence in Indochina. We feel that we should somehow control events over there because of a 10-year war from which we walked away from 14 years ago. In that 14 years, China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union have invested heavily in a geopolitical struggle for Cambodia.

For the past 10 years, Vietnam has had 150,000 troops in Cambodia, a country the size of Missouri. That is more troops than the Soviet Union had in Afghanistan. They were unable to subdue the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge. Russia has also built a submarine base at Kampong Som. China, Russia, and Vietnam all see critical strategic reasons for influencing the outcome in Cambodia.

The stakes are high in the struggle for Cambodia. Lethal aid to the NCR does not begin to give us serious influence there.

I do not advocate turning our back on Cambodia. There are better ways to help Cambodia than simply supplying arms to an alliance dominated by the Khmer Rouge.

Mr. Chairman, I would suggest six things this morning that we should begin immediately.

First, we should stop covert lethal aid to Cambodia. Covert aid at this stage of events is covert only to the American people.

Second, we should participate in a multinational Marshall plan for Cambodia. We should pledge to aid any emergent government in Phnom Penh that does not include the Khmer Rouge and that guarantees human rights, supports free elections, and permits open markets.

Democracy in Cambodia must be built from the village level. The elections that Hun Sen has announced to take place in 3 months will take place in a political vacuum, and we should discourage over reliance on their importance.

Three, we should take a leadership position in reconvening the Paris meetings. We should even suggest that it be held in the United States, perhaps utilizing the leadership of former President Carter, who has the credibility to accomplish the difficult negotiations which will be necessary.

Fourth, we should pursue an active role in the United Nations and seek a condemnation and isolation of the Khmer Rouge. China should be encouraged to remove the Pol Pot clique and soften the Khmer Rouge agenda.

Fifth, we should challenge General Secretary Gorbachev to reduce tensions in Southeast Asia by reducing military aid to Hanoi by 50 percent and replacing it with economic aid.

And sixth, we should reaffirm our commitment to Thailand's security and give it preeminence in policy decisions, particularly concerning the relocation of refugees.

It is also, Mr. Chairman, important for the United States to consider the question of normalizing relations with Vietnam, at the same time that it is working toward a political solution in Cambodia. And above all, we should be guided by the following principles:

No. 1, normalization must occur within the context of an overall agreement for Indochina. Control for Laos and Cambodia has been an openly stated objective of the Vietnamese Communist for over 60 years. The Indochinese Communist Party is the parent of the Khmer Rouge. This Vietnamese desire for hegemony has not ended. The events following the Communist takeover of Vietnam and Cambodia have taught us that we were wrong to view communism as a monolith. The antipathy between China and Vietnam are at least as great as that between Vietnam and Cambodia.

However, Mr. Chairman, we should not compound that error by forgetting that events have proved the case that Vietnam has expansionist plans.

Second, normalization must not occur as a part of some agreement to get a full accounting for our POW's and MIA's. I believe we should decouple these two issues. We should not beg or bribe the Vietnamese into decency.

General Vessey's commission has taken important first steps toward opening dialog with Vietnam. Those steps have been undercut by the failure to deliver the private humanitarian assistance he promised. The U.S. Government should encourage the formation of private aid by giving a clear signal to business that such aid has U.S. endorsement.

There are, for example, private groups of American veterans who stand ready to introduce, for example, a mobile prosthetic leg lab to Vietnam that would be operated by the Vietnamese. And this should be implemented by the United States.

The Cambodian people deserve our help. It is an opportunity for us to show the world that we continue to care about the freedom of the Indochinese people. It is an opportunity for us to show the world that we are prepared to make a long-term and bipartisan commitment to achieve that objective.

The people and values of the United States are given great currency by the Cambodian people. I believe we should demonstrate that their confidence in us is well placed. I believe they are worthy of our effort, though progress will no doubt be accompanied by some disappointment.

The dry season for fighting has arrived in Cambodia again. And the killing has already started. We must, as a nation, temper the urgency we feel for action by keeping our attention focused upon the Cambodian people themselves, and by measuring our action with the three pillars of our own society: human rights, democracy, and free markets. If we do, and if we stay the course, our policies will succeed.

Thank you.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Senator Kerrey. That is very, very forceful and constructive testimony, coming, I know, out of great experiences of yours and a continuing effort to understand and carry on your own contribution to the situation there. And your recommendations are worth very close examination, and I thank you very, very much.

Senator KERREY. You are welcome.

Senator CRANSTON. Senator Murkowski, do you have any questions or comments before Bob leaves?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have one point, Senator. I believe in your statement you indicated that we should stop covert lethal aid to the non-Communists.

Senator KERREY. Yes.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And it is my understanding that we do not provide lethal aid, we provide covert aid. And that information is available to Senator Cranston and myself as members of the Intelligence Committee. I think it is a small point, but a fairly important one. Do you agree?

Senator KERREY. Run that by me again. We do not provide covert lethal aid, we provide covert aid?

Senator MURKOWSKI. No, we do not provide lethal aid, we provide covert aid. Now, everybody can interpret that a little differently.

Senator KERREY. Well, how I would interpret that, though, Senator, is that it is covert to the American people.

Senator MURKOWSKI. That certainly is an interpretation of covert.

Senator KERREY. The details of the aid, as to whether or not it is lethal or nonlethal, are covert only to the American people. They are not covert to Sihanouk, they are not covert to the Khmer

Rouge, they are not covert to any of the other players in Southeast Asia, other than the American people.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, I think the point that is appropriate to make is that we do not provide lethal aid.

I have no further questions.

Senator CRANSTON. And we do not provide lethal aid, and I hope we will continue not to provide lethal aid.

Thank you very much, Bob.

Our next witness is David Lambertson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State.

Mr. Lambertson, we welcome you.

STATEMENT OF DAVID LAMBERTSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have also submitted for the record a written statement and if I may I would like to make a few summary remarks.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes, your whole statement will appear as if read.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Thank you.

The United States goal, with respect to the conflict in Cambodia, continues to be to achieve a negotiated political settlement, one that is comprehensive in nature and which provides not only for a verified Vietnamese withdrawal, but for effective measures to prevent a Khmer Rouge return to power and, through a process of fair elections, self-determination for the Cambodian people.

We believe an interim coalition government, headed by Prince Sihanouk, should be established to oversee a process leading to such elections. We believe that Sihanouk must have that leadership role inasmuch as he remains the single most authentic symbol of Cambodian nationalism.

We do not accept the legitimacy of the PRK, which was installed and sustained for 10½ years by Vietnamese military force and which, itself, is led by former members of the Khmer Rouge. Nor, of course, can we accept the possibility of a return to power by the Khmer Rouge.

We and the international community in general have a moral obligation to seek to prevent this.

Our own strong preference, as Secretary Baker has stated, would be that the Khmer Rouge have no role in an interim coalition or in any permanent government that flowed from it.

Prince Sihanouk, the ASEAN governments, that is to say, the parties most directly affected by the outcome of this conflict, and the international community in general, as represented at the Paris conference, believe that to exclude the Khmer Rouge from this process would be to ensure continued warfare.

We have said that we would accede in that judgment, provided that the worst of the Khmer Rouge leaders are indeed excluded from the process and provided that the process itself results in a

comprehensive solution which would put in place formidable barriers to a Khmer Rouge return to power.

We have made it clear also that our own ability to support such an interim government or any permanent government would be in inverse proportion to the degree of Khmer Rouge participation in that government.

A comprehensive settlement, in our view, must also provide for an effective international peacekeeping force, and it should be under United Nations auspices. And its role would be to verify the withdrawal, to participate in monitoring a cease-fire and the garrisoning of forces and their demobilization, and ultimately to monitor an election process.

So, those were our goals at the Paris conference. They were goals that were shared by a majority of nations represented there: a complete and verified Vietnamese withdrawal, the establishment of an international peacekeeping force, putting in place international guarantees of Cambodia's neutrality, a fair election process organized by an interim coalition headed by Prince Sihanouk.

We worked actively and hard at the Paris conference to try to achieve these objectives and this outcome. Some progress was made, in particular in the work of the committees which dealt with the mandate of an international control mechanism, with international guarantees, and with the repatriation of refugees and international reconstruction.

Much useful work was accomplished, and it could be drawn upon again in the future when the negotiating process resumes.

Moreover, the conference rejected at its outset the concept of a partial settlement; that is to say, one which addressed only the so-called external aspects of the issue, Vietnamese withdrawal, reconstruction, international peacekeeping, while leaving unresolved the core political issue: How to put together a coalition regime?

A partial settlement was recognized by virtually all participants in Paris as a formula for continued warfare. That core issue could not be resolved.

Hence, a comprehensive settlement was not achievable in August in Paris. The reason for this was the refusal of Hanoi and the PRK to consider any formula for powersharing that would in any real sense have diluted the PRK's governing power.

With even a modicum of flexibility on that issue, an agreement could have been reached on the establishment of an interim coalition regime and had it been, the other aspects of the comprehensive settlement would, I believe, quickly have fallen into place.

The Paris conference was not the final chapter in a diplomatic effort to resolve the Cambodian conflict. Some real progress was made in Paris. The conference itself remains in being as a diplomatic mechanism which can be used again, and the conference usefully affirmed the need for a comprehensive settlement and for the central leadership role to be played by Prince Sihanouk.

It represented, therefore, an important step forward. We want to build on the progress made in Paris, attempt to sustain the momentum that it generated, and move the conflict back to the negotiating table as soon as possible.

To that end we are continuing actively to discuss the issue with the permanent five members of the Security Council, with ASEAN, and with other key participants in the Paris conference.

As you know, the Secretary, Secretary Baker, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed the issue in Wyoming. It also was discussed in numerous bilateral meetings last week in New York.

We intend also to continue our support for the non-Communist resistance and for Prince Sihanouk without whose role a negotiated settlement is very difficult to envision.

We continue strongly to believe that a negotiated political solution truly comprehensive in nature is the surest way to prevent a return to power by the Khmer Rouge.

The alternative to such a negotiated settlement is further warfare whose outcome is unpredictable and yet more suffering for the Cambodian people.

I might say a few words about the state of United States-Vietnam relations.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have stated for some time that normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam would have to follow not only a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, but their participation in achieving an acceptable political outcome of that conflict.

We have said consistently that the pace and scope of the normalization process would be affected by the degree of cooperation we received from Vietnam on POW, MIA and other humanitarian issues. That issue remains a matter of the highest national importance to us, and it remains properly, as Senator Kerrey said, decoupled from the political issue of Cambodia.

In addition to the relationship that we maintain with Vietnam in terms of our humanitarian dialog, we have developed an increasingly broad agenda with Laos. We are pleased with the way that relationship is progressing.

The most recent step in that process was agreement just 2 days ago, a bilateral agreement on cooperation in the field of narcotics, a most welcome development from our perspective.

But, with Vietnam itself inasmuch as we do not yet have that acceptable settlement, inasmuch as it was quite clear to us and to all the participants in Paris that the key obstacle to a settlement was inflexibility and rigidity on the part of Hanoi and the PRK with respect to the formation of an interim coalition, we believe that the basic outline of our existing policy toward Vietnam must continue in effect.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lambertson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LAMBERTSON

Mr. Chairman, Senator Murkowski, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the committee today to discuss the current situation in Cambodia and our policies in support of efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement there.

THE BASIC SITUATION

We are meeting in the wake of the well-publicized withdrawal of Vietnam's regular troops from Cambodia. We hope that this withdrawal proves to have been true and complete. The withdrawal of these forces has been a goal of ASEAN, the United States, and the vast majority of the nations of the world since the Vietnamese inva-

sion almost 11 years ago. However, we believe that the international community will only accept Hanoi's claim of a total withdrawal upon verification by a credible international control mechanism, and we believe strongly that this must be under United Nations auspices—and within the context of a comprehensive political settlement.

By itself, the Vietnamese troop withdrawal does not bring peace to Cambodia—nor does it end Vietnam's responsibilities to its neighbor. At present it appears that Hanoi is leaving behind an unstable situation with the Cambodian parties poised on the edge of escalating violence. Hanoi has the obligation to join with the Cambodian parties in a conscientious effort to negotiate a political settlement of this tragic conflict based on genuine self-determination for the Cambodian people. We are convinced that only a comprehensive political solution can establish the stability necessary both to end the suffering of the Cambodian people and to prevent a return to dominance of the murderous Khmer Rouge.

Unfortunately, absent a viable political process, the Cambodian factions are likely to turn increasingly to military means to resolve their conflict, a result most likely to benefit the Khmer Rouge. The United States remains unalterably opposed to a return to dominance of this abhorrent group, which left a legacy of brutality and depravity from its reign of terror during the 1970's. A durable settlement in this conflict must be constructed to ensure that the Khmer Rouge can never regain control and subject the Cambodian people once again to the horrors of the past.

This administration remains committed to supporting actively the diplomatic and political efforts underway to promote a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian conflict. We believe that a stable and lasting political settlement in Cambodia will bring to an end the suffering of the Cambodian people, reestablish a free and independent Cambodia, and enhance the political stability and economic prosperity of Southeast Asia—by ending a potential threat to Thailand and removing a source of regional tension.

As one element in our active diplomacy to support a Cambodian settlement, the Secretary recently held useful discussions about Cambodia with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Wyoming. We both advocated a comprehensive political settlement and a continuation of the negotiating process. We also agreed on the importance of averting both increased bloodshed and the return of the Pol Pot regime to power, and declared our readiness to announce, together with other states, a moratorium on military assistance to all Cambodian factions as part of a comprehensive settlement. We hope these discussions will result in a more constructive Soviet role in this process. We will continue to work on resolving the Cambodian conflict with the Soviets in the context of the United Nations, the continuing Paris conference process and on a bilateral basis.

PARIS CONFERENCE MOMENTUM

Fortunately, diplomatic avenues toward achieving a comprehensive Cambodian settlement remain open. In this regard, it is important not to lose sight of the valuable progress made at the Paris conference on Cambodia. Although the conference did not achieve any breakthroughs, many settlement details were resolved and a generally positive momentum established.

The conference confirmed the necessity of a comprehensive settlement; a partial solution was seen as a recipe for continued violence. At the conference there was also a virtual consensus that the United Nations must play the central role in any settlement process. Finally, on the technical level the conference participants accomplished a good deal of valuable work on the specific elements involved in peacekeeping, guarantees, and rehabilitation and repatriation.

While the Paris conference brought the peace process closer to a comprehensive settlement, the conference was unable to resolve the central issue of powersharing. Unfortunately, Hanoi and the Phnom Penh regime were not prepared to negotiate seriously regarding the establishment of a coalition government under Prince Sihanouk to guide the country to democratic elections. Hun Sen showed no willingness to relinquish any authority during the transition period. In fact, in his final statement to the conference, Hun Sen went so far as to admit his refusal to share power with anyone before elections are held—under PRK authority. The result of elections under solely PRK authority—without international supervision—would be determined in advance, since there would be no opportunity for meaningful competition. It is difficult to understand why the Phnom Penh regime continues to oppose free and fair elections, if it is as popular as its public relations campaign portrays it to be. Free and fair elections, under the authority of an interim coalition government and supervised by the United Nations, should provide an opportunity for all

political parties to compete on a fair and equal basis. We must now work to overcome the intransigence of the Phnom Penh regime and support steps to achieve national reconciliation in Cambodia. The conference framework provides a new institutional tool we can use in working toward a peaceful solution.

In their closing statement, the conference participants agreed that the copresidents, France and Indonesia, will continue to facilitate the efforts of all parties to work toward the goal of a comprehensive political settlement. In this regard, the copresidents have agreed to consult with all participants within 6 months with a view toward reconvening the conference. During these consultations, we urge all parties, particularly Hanoi and Phnom Penh, to show the utmost flexibility in seeking a solution through diplomacy. We will do all that we can to support this and other ongoing efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Cambodian conflict.

UNALTERABLE OPPOSITION TO A KHMER ROUGE RETURN TO POWER

This administration unalterably opposes a return to dominance of the Khmer Rouge. We believe that this can only be accomplished through a durable solution based on a comprehensive settlement which incorporates a series of effective measures to ensure that this barbarous group will be contained. While the precise measures to be adopted remain a crucial area of negotiation among the Cambodian parties, their supporters, and interested members of the international community, it is clear that discredited Khmer Rouge leaders, including Pol Pot, should not be allowed to play any role in a future Cambodian government. In this regard, we regularly press all those involved to cut back their aid to the Khmer Rouge and otherwise help control the KR in the context of a comprehensive Cambodian solution.

We have made widely known our strong preference that the Khmer Rouge not participate in future Cambodian governments. The non-Communist Cambodians, whom we support, led by Prince Sihanouk, and the ASEAN countries, which have been leading the effort to achieve a political settlement, maintain that leaving the Khmer Rouge completely out of an interim regime—which would guide the country until free and fair elections could be arranged—is certain to result in a bloody civil war.

While noting the argument for including elements of the Khmer Rouge, we continue to urge that the Khmer Rouge role be minimized to the maximum extent possible, and strongly advocate that the final settlement contain concrete provisions, such as a United Nations monitoring and peacekeeping force, to help inhibit a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. We have also made clear that our ability to support any Cambodian government is directly and inversely related to the degree of Khmer Rouge participation, if any, in it.

NONACCEPTANCE OF UNILATERAL PHNOM PENH REGIME CONTROL

At the same time, the leaders of the Phnom Penh regime share this unacceptable background; many are former Khmer Rouge officials from the Eastern Military Zone of Cambodia—including Prime Minister Hun Sen, Communist Party leader Heng Samrin, and National Assembly leader Chea Sim. These former KR officials also represent an illegitimate regime imposed and sustained for the past decade by foreign force of arms; the Phnom Penh regime is also acquiring a significant reputation for corruption.

Hun Sen has proved himself to be an able political tactician and competent manipulator of the news media; however, we can assume that as chief of staff and regimental deputy commander for his military region before defecting from the Khmer Rouge to Vietnam in 1977, Hun Sen participated at a responsible level in the kind of murderous activities that have made the Khmer Rouge name a byword for infamy.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR PRINCE SIHANOUK

In this upcoming period, it is critical to maintain support for Prince Sihanouk and the non-Communists. The non-Communist parties must remain strong to provide viable alternatives to both Communist groups: the Vietnamese-imposed Phnom Penh regime and the hated Khmer Rouge. Prince Sihanouk's leadership in the interim period preceding elections remains crucial in providing a focus for the national reconciliation process which remains the elusive element in achieving a comprehensive settlement. We believe that Prince Sihanouk must have real executive authority to maintain stability during the crucial period before elections are held.

While the core of our support for Prince Sihanouk is a sustained diplomatic effort, we believe that strengthening our program of assistance for the Cambodian Non-

Communist Resistance (NCR) will allow the NCR to play a key role in a settlement which serves the best interests of the Cambodian people and prevents a Khmer Rouge return to power.

We are not alone in supporting the NCR; the non-Communists have been receiving assistance in a variety of forms from a number of countries. Our efforts are in support of and at the request of the non-Communists and these countries. U.S. Government assistance to the non-Communist resistance has been and continues to be nonlethal.

May I point out that our support for the non-Communists is minor in comparison to the massive quantity of military and other assistance provided to Phnom Penh by the Soviet Union, either directly or via Vietnam—an amount estimated at $1.1 billion between 1984 and 1988. There are continuing reports that this Soviet assistance—a massive amount for a country of only 7 million people—has increased dramatically this year—suggesting that the PRK is moving away from diplomatic initiatives to achieve a peaceful settlement in preparation for a return to the battlefield.

NOT YET TIME FOR NORMALIZATION WITH VIETNAM

We have made clear that normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam can only occur after a complete and verified withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in the context of an acceptable political settlement to the Cambodian conflict. The Vietnamese know as well that, as a practical reality, the pace and scope of the normalization process will be affected by their continued cooperation with us on the POW/MIA issue and other humanitarian concerns.

In light of all these developments, including Vietnamese intransigence in Paris, the current stalemate regarding a comprehensive settlement, and apparent movement backward toward a military option, normalization of United States relations with Vietnam would be premature. In the current situation, we plan to steadfastly maintain our support for the diplomatic and economic isolation of Vietnam as a reminder to the Vietnamese that attempts to manipulate international opinion will not provide a real basis for improved relations with other countries.

CONCLUSION

The hard work accomplished at the Paris conference on defining the technical elements of a settlement agreement brings much closer to reality an acceptable solution in Cambodia, one that verifies Vietnam's withdrawal, incorporates the necessary elements to prevent a Khmer Rouge return to power, and allows genuine self-determination for the Cambodian people. What is required now is the flexibility and political will on the part of Hanoi and Phnom Penh necessary to achieve a settlement through negotiations.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Press reports after the failure of the Paris conference seem to indicate that perhaps the administration was having second thoughts on the idea of providing military assistant to the non-Communist resistance. Is that the case? What is our present view of that?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We continue to believe that it is very important to support and sustain the non-Communist resistance as an independent third force on the Cambodian scene.

We believe that in their absence a negotiated settlement is not only difficult, it is virtually impossible to envision.

The Khmer Rouge and the PRK are very unlikely ever to sit down and negotiate their differences. However, a comprehensive settlement, we believe could be achieved around Prince Sihanouk as the key central figure, and Prince Sihanouk's position and his ability to play that role requires that the non-Communist resistance remain in being and remain themselves an effective player. So, we intend to continue supporting them.

Senator CRANSTON. But are we still advocating seeking military support for him?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We continually review the question of the type and quantity of assistance that we provide.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, we are reviewing it, but are we advocating it at the present time?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I would leave it at that, Senator. We are reviewing it.

We would, of course, take no decisions in this area without appropriate consultations with the appropriate committees of Congress.

Senator CRANSTON. Have we had any direct contact with the Hun Sen government since the Paris conference?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. No, we have not.

Senator CRANSTON. In congressional testimony in September Assistant Secretary Solomon referred to a bipartite structure implying that the Sihanouk and KPNLF forces should be considered as one and that if Hun Sen and Sihanouk could work out a settlement, we would support them, even if it excluded the Khmer Rouge.

Is that an accurate interpretation of our policy?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. We have always said that the question of whether or not the Khmer Rouge should be excluded or included must be ultimately left up to the Cambodian parties themselves to decide, and we particular would follow Prince Sihanouk's lead in this regard.

The important objective is to achieve a negotiated settlement, and it is presently Prince Sihanouk's judgment and, as I noted, also the judgment of not only the ASEAN governments, but of most of the governments represented at the Paris conference, that a quadripartite solution is going to be required.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, if that is the case, why did we insist on the quadripartite formula in Paris? Are we not the only ones really insisting on a Khmer Rouge role?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. No. On the contrary, Mr. Chairman, we were virtually alone in Paris in not advocating a quadripartite settlement. We never explicitly have advocated such a settlement.

We have always said that this is a matter that the Cambodian parties themselves must decide.

The conference itself formally, even in its formal mandate, a document which was adopted through some mechanism that was never clear to us, called for the conference to pursue a quadripartite solution to this conflict.

Virtually every government represented there in one manner or another supported that approach. We were, as I say, virtually alone in never advocating a quadripartite solution.

Senator CRANSTON. What is our assessment concerning the Vietnamese troop withdrawal? Do we believe they have withdrawn their troops totally?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. They appear to have withdrawn the bulk of their troops.

I am very much aware of assertions on the part of various regional governments that massive numbers of Vietnamese forces remain. We cannot corroborate that.

On the other hand, we have no means of knowing for sure the withdrawal was not monitored or verified, and it is entirely possi-

ble, it seems to me, that there could be some Vietnamese forces or at least individual soldiers, cadre left behind. We simply do not know.

Senator CRANSTON. I believe you indicated in your statement at the outset that we did want to have a verification process in place; is that correct?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. Why did we refuse to accept the idea of a United Nations verification process?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, from the outset of the Paris conference, we and roughly 13 of 16 governments represented there called for an international control mechanism to be under United Nations auspices. The Vietnamese, the PRK, and the Soviets rejected that approach asserting that the United Nations had been partial in the past and was not objective.

We also made clear from the outset—and this was a position that was shared by a large majority of governments represented in Paris—that the international control mechanism should be dispatched to Cambodia as part of a comprehensive settlement and that in the absence of a comprehensive settlement, the international conference was not inclined to endorse Vietnam's withdrawal.

So, we did not wish to have a United Nations team sent for the purpose of essentially rubberstamping a withdrawal consisting of columns crossing the Vietnamese border along Highway 1.

Senator CRANSTON. We were afraid that the United Nations verification process would not be one we could depend upon?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. That would have not been a verification process that would have worked.

In our view the ICM that we and other delegations in Paris were working toward and which we still hope can be put in place in Cambodia would be a large, relatively large force stationed throughout the country which would have the capacity, indeed, to investigate charges either of cease-fire violations or of the presence of Vietnamese troops.

The Vietnamese and the PRK at the very end of the 30-day meeting in Paris, having for 25 days adamantly opposed any United Nations role in an international control mechanism then at the very end, knowing that it would be unacceptable because a comprehensive settlement had not been reached, they then proposed that the United Nations go in and watch their troops withdraw.

Senator CRANSTON. Our policy now seems to be recognition for Vietnam after a Vietnamese troop withdrawal and in the context of a settlement in Cambodia. Is that placing more responsibility upon Vietnam for the achievement of a settlement in Cambodia than on the People's Republic of China which supplies the Khmer Rouge, or the Soviet Union, which supplies the state of Cambodia?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I think the Vietnamese have an obligation, a responsibility, and an ability to bring about the political solution that we were not able to achieve in Paris.

Senator CRANSTON. But how can they do that, though, when the Chinese and the Soviets are playing the parts they are playing?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, the Soviet role is entirely supportive of Vietnam. It is not, in any sense, separate or contradictory.

Senator CRANSTON. But the Chinese is not——

Mr. LAMBERTSON. The Chinese, of course, is a different matter. What we needed in Paris was agreement on an interim coalition regime.

Prince Sihanouk put a proposal on the table that would have been realistic; it was modest in its demands. It would not have required the PRK administration to disappear, by any means.

The Hun Sen government stuck to its longstanding position, that the only sort of merger of the factions would take place in a superstructure above the government organization, whose only responsibility would be to organize elections, but with the PRK government itself left fully intact.

And the PRK never budged from that position; Vietnam never budged from it. And had Hanoi wished to have a political settlement in Paris in August, we could have had one.

Senator CRANSTON. A State Department spokesman said last month that normalization of relations with Vietnam was premature. At the same time, the spokesman said that the United States hoped that minimizing contacts through Vietnam would convince them, "To adopt a more cooperative approach toward seeking a comprehensive political resolution of the Cambodian conflict."

Would you characterize those statements as a softening of the previous American position, totally linking normalization to a settlement in Cambodia?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. No. I believe that is a reiteration of the policy as it has stood for some time now, Senator.

Senator CRANSTON. My time is expired.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, the Paris talks have failed generally because of two reasons: The question of powersharing in an interim government was certainly one, and the other was a U.N.-organized international control mechanism.

With regard to powersharing, I am curious to know, in the Phnom Penh regime, there seems to be some who suggested the Khmer Rouge is really the reason for not reaching agreement on powersharing in Cambodia.

Did the PRK or the Hun Sen regime ever make an offer to Sihanouk to share power, to your knowledge, and if so, what was the result of that?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. To my knowledge, no such offer has ever been made. The PRK has never invited Sihanouk to participate in a bilateral coalition in which Sihanouk would have any more than figurehead status. They have never offered him real power.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. What is the current assessment for the power base, the political power base, of Hun Sen, in view of the Vietnamese withdrawal? And might it be concluded that he is trying to establish his government as the Government of Vietnam as a consequence of the Vietnamese withdrawal, and this is more or less of an effort to make a determination of just how strong his influence is?

And what is our assessment on whether or not he might be successful? Because, certainly, he is not willing to support Sihanouk in any type of a powersharing effort.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. That may well be what the PRK calculates, that it is strong enough to stand on its own, and thereby to attain a degree of legitimacy that it now lacks.

I do not know the answer to this, nor does anyone.

Senator MURKOWSKI. What is our assessment of this strength?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, our own assessment is, I think, that the—with the beginning of the dry season which is coming soon, there is likely to be intensified fighting, unfortunately. Indeed, there are press reports today of considerable action on the part of the KPNLF, one of the two non-Communist factions, in the area near the Thai-Cambodian border.

The relative strengths of the various Cambodian parties is something that we understand only in general terms.

The non-Communist resistance comprises, perhaps, 35,000 soldiers at the present time; the Khmer Rouge, probably 40,000. The PRK, itself, perhaps 40,000 to 45,000, main force; perhaps 100,000 militia, half of them unarmed.

There are, presumably, disparities in the effectiveness of various units, in the degree of commitment, the degree of discipline that they have, and it is conceivable that all of the Cambodian factions, to some degree, see this as a time of testing, a sorting out of exactly where they do stand, vis-a-vis each other, in the absence, for the first time, of large numbers of Vietnamese troops. This is an unfortunate prospect, and it is one that we hope will not be prolonged.

Our objective is going to continue to be to get negotiations started again as soon as possible. But there is, at the same time, probably, in Cambodia, going to be a period of stepped-up fighting.

Senator MURKOWSKI. You indicated to the chairman that we had not had any communication with the Hun Sen government since the Paris peace talk, or the Paris talks, I should say.

My question specifically is, would it not expedite our role if we could establish some kind of an unofficial channel of communication without giving them any diplomatic legitimacy?

You stated yourself it is vital that negotiations continue or be initiated again. How do you do that if you do not have any communication?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, we have communication with the parties that have great influence over the PRK, including Vietnam, with whom we had a couple of meetings in Paris on this issue, and the Soviet Union. We intend to continue those various contacts.

As I said, we are going to be working actively among the permanent five in the Security Council, with ASEAN and with the other key participants in the Paris conference, to try to get this thing back on the tracks.

We look to the Soviets to contribute to this process.

Senator MURKOWSKI. If I may interrupt on that point?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, sir.

Senator MURKOWSKI. How helpful were the Soviets in Paris?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. My own view is that they were somewhat passive in Paris, quite frankly. If there was any arm twisting going on behind the scenes, it was not particularly evident.

We, nevertheless—Secretary Baker's conversations with Minister Shevardnadze in Wyoming, I think, indicated to us some cause for encouragement.

Mr. Shevardnadze reaffirmed his government's intention to work toward a comprehensive settlement, so we have a basis for working together, and we are going to pursue that, as well as a variety of other diplomatic contacts.

Senator MURKOWSKI. The administration has indicated a very cautious effort to progress on our relationships with Vietnam, citing, among other things, a concern over the resolve of the Cambodian situation in general terms.

But is there any point in us keeping pressure on Vietnam, and outside of a formal recognition, and other diplomatic avenues, what leverage do we have on the Vietnamese, currently, that we could use to expedite their resolve of the Cambodian dilemma?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I think the policy that we have pursued for 10 years, frankly, remains still valid, inasmuch as we have not yet gotten the settlement that Cambodia must have. That is to say, we have minimized our own economic involvement with Vietnam, obviously; we have not taken steps to normalize relations; we have encouraged other governments to adopt similar policies.

I think that it was this international isolation that was a major factor in bringing about Vietnam's withdrawal—contributed to that decision. And I think, and I continue to hope that it will weigh increasingly heavily in Vietnam's consideration as they look to the future.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Secretary, you have given us an overview here, but you really have not highlighted where you see the likelihood of the log jam breaking as a consequence of the inability of the Paris talks to bring about a resolution.

The Vietnamese have withdrawn; we are continuing to remain aloof, in a sense, because we do not want to step in there and initiate any recognition of Vietnam without a resolution.

Time is passing. You have indicated the necessity to get a resolution, but how do you get it?

You are saying you encourage the parties to continue to communicate. Are we going to have to wait and see whether Hun Sen is successful in efforts to establish a government in Cambodia, exclusive of the influence of Sihanouk, and with or without a degree of support from the Khmer Rouge, or is there some other scenario?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, there may be a certain hiatus before negotiations can begin again. I think everyone would want to be assured that they would have a better chance of success the next time around than we had in Paris.

And the core issue is the political question; the organization of an interim coalition, powersharing.

And the reason for the failure of the Paris Conference was PRK/Vietnamese rigidity on that issue. Therefore, the obstacle, the logjam, resides there, and there needs to be a new look taken at that question by the PRK and by Vietnam.

When that is going to happen, I do not know. We are going to try to do everything that we can, through diplomatic means, to hasten that process, through our talks with the Soviets and others.

And I cannot predict when the situation will once again get back to the negotiating table; we hope it is soon.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So, you do not see any congressional action appropriate at this time?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, as the administration, we, of course, appreciate congressional support for the general policy outline we are pursuing. In particular, expressions of——

Senator MURKOWSKI. Yes. But we are not controlling the agenda here. The agenda is unfolding over there, based on the power structures internally, and I gather that there is no congressional action, just support of the administration in their efforts to encourage or resolve, even though we do not have the leverage to do much.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, I think that expressions of support for the importance of achieving a comprehensive political settlement could be important. I think to the extent the United States can show a degree of unity on this issue our voice becomes more effective.

We are not seeking a military victory in Cambodia, needless to say, I should add. What we are attempting to achieve is a political settlement.

We believe that in order for there to be a political settlement, the non-Communist resistance must be able to play its role as an independent third force.

The U.S. position is not one that is supportive of the Khmer Rouge. On the contrary, I would hope that we have made ourselves as clear as we possibly could on that issue.

Indeed, the primary moral objective here is to achieve a solution that will prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. We strongly believe that the best way to do that is to have a negotiated settlement.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you. I just have two or three more questions.

According to the Far Eastern Economic Review at a September meeting of the IMF executive board, only the United States and Japan blocked an IMF loan to Vietnam, despite a "glowing report" on Hanoi's economic program, which includes a liberal foreign investment law apparently.

If one of our foreign policy objectives is to promote economic liberalization, capitalism in Communist countries, and plainly it is, why are we blocking an IMF loan to Vietnam when other executive board members, including Britain, West Germany, and France, supported it?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I am not familiar with the outcome of that particular meeting that the Far East Economic Review cites.

It is our policy to oppose loans by international financial institutions to Vietnam as part of our general approach linked to Cambodia and Vietnam's failure to assist in achieving a comprehensive settlement of that conflict.

Senator CRANSTON. What is your analysis of why China will not end its support for the Khmer Rouge? China is one of Sihanouk's staunchest allies, I gather.

Do you think it is an independent and neutral Cambodia which China wants or is it a really war-torn country threatening Vietnam with its instability?

If it is the former, there would be plenty of room for accommodation. If it is the latter, then there is little room to negotiate on this matter with the Chinese.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I think the Chinese would support and contribute, help to uphold a comprehensive negotiated settlement.

The Chinese have made it abundantly clear that in the absence of a comprehensive settlement they will continue to supply the Khmer Rouge.

I believe, however, that if a settlement were achieved, China would go along with it and, indeed, would work to make it hang together.

I base this only on the evolution that we have seen in the Chinese position on this issue over the past year and more.

Senator CRANSTON. Does a comprehensive settlement mean to the Chinese the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge as it does to us?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, it does. In the process, in the political process to lead to fair elections.

Senator CRANSTON. We share that particular viewpoint with China?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We have, as I said earlier, Mr. Chairman, acceded in the view of Sihanouk, the ASEAN governments, and roughly 13 of 16 participants in the Paris conference that a settlement in order to be achievable, would have to be quadripartite. We have never advocated that solution.

We would prefer no Khmer Rouge role.

Senator CRANSTON. There have been reports that Thailand, which has long been the conduit for arms to the NCR and the Khmer Rouge is now, according to at least one "senior Western diplomat" giving serious consideration to an arms cutoff. Is that accurate as far as you know?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Prime Minister Chatchai has from time to time spoken of an early cease-fire. I am not aware of a specific proposal by Thailand for an early arms cutoff.

Our own view would be that both of these steps, though intrinsically desirable, need to be taken in the context of a comprehensive settlement.

The Khmer Rouge is generously supplied already. So, certainly is the PRK. An arms cutoff alone would not solve the problem.

Senator CRANSTON. I will yield to Senator Helms at this point, and I have to go and make one phone call.

Senator HELMS. Sure. We will take over the committee while you are gone.

Senator CRANSTON. OK.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, before you leave, I was detained because of a meeting with another gentleman who is combating communism, Jonas Savimbi, and he has apprehensions about the posture of our Government with respect to Angola.

And the State Department is all over the lot in what they say or think is the case there.

I have the same apprehensions about this business of this propaganda blitz to stampede the administration into recognizing the Hanoi regime. So, I just wanted you to know where I was. I was not being derelict. I just could not be in two places at one time.

Senator CRANSTON. I know that you are always busy, and I will be right back.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Recognition of Hanoi bothers me. I wish Jeremiah Denton were here; for example, to talk about what he went through in the hands of that regime.

I will just ask you do you not believe that recognition would carry with it an implicit recognition of the conquest of Indochina on Hanoi's terms?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, in the sense that we are not prepared to normalize relations with Hanoi until they cooperate in resolving the conflict in Cambodia, which remains unresolved.

Senator HELMS. Well, of all the Communist regimes, Hanoi has been the most notorious about interfering in U.S. domestic policies and politics.

If they had an embassy here, would that not just enhance their opportunities for mischief?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I am sure it would.

Senator HELMS. Also, would it not enhance their opportunities to intimidate the Vietnamese community here in the United States, and it is considerable, particularly in Washington, DC?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, sir. I presume it would have greater access to the community. I presume they would be under the same sort of restrictions that we try to place on other Embassies of countries inclined to do that sort of thing.

Senator HELMS. I took a look a while ago at Mr. Conboy's prepared testimony, and it reminded me that the United States abided by the 1962 Laos agreement and withdrew our entire military assistance and advisory group. But, in flagrant disregard for the Geneva agreement, Hanoi left complete divisions of troops in Laos.

Given that sort of record—and there are other things—how can we accept Hanoi's claim of a complete pullout from Cambodia? Do you believe it?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. We discussed this a bit earlier, Senator.

In my view we cannot corroborate the reports of massive numbers of Vietnamese troops still remaining in Cambodia.

On the other hand, we certainly cannot say that all have departed. The withdrawal was not monitored. It has not been verified. So, the answer is "We simply do not know."

Senator HELMS. Do you think we ought to know before we do anything?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Yes, I think we should insist that the Vietnamese withdrawal has to be complete, and it has to be verified, and this is something that could take place as one part of a comprehensive political solution.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Secretary, I have here somewhere—I was looking at it earlier this morning—where the Vietnamese Communist Party chairman gave a series of hard line speeches against what he called bourgeoisie liberalism—pluralism, political plurality, and multiopposition parties, and he said Vietnam resolutely opposed pluralism and opposition parties.

Given this attitude can you think of any reason why the free world should make any effort to end Vietnam's international isolation?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Our participation in Vietnam's international isolation is related strictly to Cambodia.

If the Vietnamese cooperated on Cambodia, helped us bring about the solution that is needed in Cambodia, that is the formal condition that would have to be fulfilled before we would undertake normalization of relations.

We are very much aware that the Vietnamese regime is one of the most staunchly rigid Communist regimes in the world. It clearly has been deeply troubled by what it sees happening in Eastern Europe, and it seems to be currently retreating to an even more hard line posture.

Senator HELMS. Well, tell me, am I going over the same ground that has been covered earlier?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. No, sir, you are not. By and large, you are not.

Senator HELMS. Well, just indicate to me if so, and I will read the record and not take up extra time because we have got another panel here.

The Far Eastern Economic Review on September 14 asserted that the Vietnamese Communists held mass rallies all over Vietnam to condemn Solidarity as "counterrevolutionary forces." Is that true?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I believe it is; yes.

Senator HELMS. What does that imply for Hanoi's true intentions toward its neighbors?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Well, as I said, Senator, I think it suggests that Hanoi currently is troubled by what it sees happening in other socialist regimes around the world, does not want the same thing to happen in Vietnam, and if you translate that into what Hanoi might be intending vis-a-vis its neighbors, it suggests no real change, that they are still not convinced that they should help to bring about a settlement in Cambodia.

Senator HELMS. On September 28 the Far Eastern Economic Review, to which I have just alluded, reported at an IMF meeting on September 13 the United States and Japan blocked Hanoi's efforts to gain new loans, even though it has not paid back the loans it already.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Senator, this is one that we covered earlier. The answer is we do oppose international financial institution loans to Vietnam.

Senator HELMS. That is what I was getting at, and you read my mind.

I will have a few other questions which I will submit in writing, and I want you to know I appreciate your candor. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, Jesse.

Senator Robb also will submit some questions in writing.

[The information follows:]

RESPONSES OF MR. LAMBERTSON TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR PELL

Question. Our policy now is recognition after a Vietnamese troop withdrawal and in the context of a settlement in Cambodia. Why is Vietnam supposed to do more in terms of a settlement than for example either China which supplies the Khmer Rouge or the Soviet Union which supplies the state of Cambodia?

Answer. The United States expects all three countries to contribute to a comprehensive settlement in part by encouraging the parties closest to them to take a flexible stance and to support a durable solution. The Phnom Penh regime was created by Hanoi, and for its first 10 years of existence depended upon a large Vietnamese occupation force. Since the Vietnamese withdrawal was not internationally verified, we cannot be certain what concrete presence Hanoi still maintains in Cambodia. We are certain, however, that the Vietnamese still maintain substantial leverage with Phnom Penh. Therefore, we believe that Hanoi can and should contribute to a comprehensive settlement. It cannot just walk away from a problem which it substantially created. The obstacle to a settlement in Paris was PRK—and SRV—rigidity on the question of forming an interim coalition to prepare for free and fair elections.

Question. Given Khmer nationalism, Hun Sen's need to demonstrate his independence, and the Vietnamese troop withdrawal, how much leverage do we expect Vietnam to have over Cambodia in the coming months? What type of leverage?

Answer. Even if Hanoi has withdrawn the bulk of its forces from Cambodia, we believe that Vietnam maintains considerable influence over the Phnom Penh regime and will continue to wield that influence for the foreseeable future. Since the withdrawal was not internationally verified, we cannot be certain that all Vietnamese troops and advisers have departed. The Phnom Penh leaders have longstanding and strong personal ties to Hanoi, and these will not quickly dissolve. Possibly most importantly, Phnom Penh depends upon Vietnam for a major part of its material assistance and much of the minimal international political support it has.

Question. There is a report in the Far Eastern Economic Review (Sept. 28) that the Chinese forced Japan to postpone a visit to Tokyo this fall by the Vietnamese Foreign Minister. If accurate, why did the Japanese listen to the Chinese? And by our blocking the IMF loan, aren't we indicating our support for China's foreign policy objectives?

Answer. The first part of your question would be best addressed to the Government of Japan.

Although the Paris conference made considerable progress in outlining the external features of a possible Cambodian settlement, it reached an impasse on the crucial issue of powersharing: the establishment of an interim regime, under Prince Sihanouk, which would guide the country to democratic elections. We believe that several of the powersharing proposals which surfaced at the conference, particularly one supported by Prince Sihanouk, could have served as the basis for compromise, but Hanoi and Phnom Penh refused to engage in serious negotiations on this issue, insisting that the Phnom Penh regime remain in total control of the country until elections can be held. Under those conditions, most participants at the conference agreed, impartial elections would not be possible.

We, therefore, believe it is necessary to continue to minimize diplomatic and economic ties with both Vietnam and the Phnom Penh regime in order to encourage them to exhibit some flexibility on key issues affecting a settlement.

Question. U.S. policy has been described as one in which we let ASEAN "take the lead." But there is substantial evidence of differences within ASEAN. The Philippines have started direct airline connections with Vietnam, as have the Indonesians. The Thais have welcomed Hun Sen to Bangkok three times. Singapore is virtually the only ASEAN member which clearly still holds a tough line.

a. If we echo that position, are we not in fact echoing Singapore's (and incidentally China's) position, rather than ASEAN as a whole?

b. And since Singapore has the second highest level of trade with Vietnam outside the Socialist bloc, isn't its policy line more rhetoric than action, leaving the United States out front behind a veneer of ASEAN unity?

c. Why should we continue our trade embargo to Vietnam and Cambodia when even ASEAN doesn't respect it?

Answer. It is true that our Cambodian policy, to a considerable extent, is based on our concern for and interest in the security and well being of the ASEAN member states. This has been particularly true with respect to Thailand, which border on Cambodia and is our treaty ally. Since these countries are our closest friends in the region and since they have the most at stake in the Cambodian situation, our policy has been greatly affected by their views.

There certainly are differences in emphasis among the ASEAN states on some elements of the Cambodian situation. What is more striking, however, is the general agreement among them on the necessary ingredients of a comprehensive negotiated settlement. This agreement was highlighted in Brunei in July where they released a statement calling for a comprehensive settlement and at the Paris conference, when

the ASEAN countries joined in the overwhelmingly majority of governments calling for:

- International verification of a total Vietnamese withdrawal.
- Assurances against a return to power of the Khmer Rouge.
- An interim coalition government, led by Prince Sihanouk, to guide the country to democratic elections, a free and fair exercise of the right of self-determination by the Cambodian people.

In terms of economic ties with Vietnam, the ASEAN countries generally allow private trade, but restrict government involvement. All of those countries, however, do believe that diplomatic and economic relations with Hanoi and Phnom Penh should be limited in order to encourage them to be more flexible in negotiating a comprehensive Cambodian settlement.

Question. What is our assessment concerning the Vietnamese troop withdrawal? Assistant Secretary Solomon said in congressional testimony in September that it was our "best evidence" then that they did "plan to withdraw."

Answer. The Vietnamese have apparently withdrawn the bulk of their regular forces from Cambodia, although with no agreed-upon verification mechanism or procedure, we cannot be certain they are completely out. Some personnel may remain, but we cannot corroborate reports that disguised units have stayed behind or have been integrated into PRK forces.

Question. Hun Sen said on September 24 that he would be willing to accept a United Nations "factfinding" role in monitoring and verifying the Vietnamese pullout although he had opposed the idea during the Paris talks.

a. Doesn't this demonstrate some flexibility on his part since the collapse of the Paris talks and shouldn't we try to see how much more flexible he is willing to be?

b. Why don't we encourage the United Nations to take him up on his offer?

c. The State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, said on September 26 that we welcome the "apparent end" of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia but further noting that "I use the word 'apparently' because there is no mechanism in place to monitor or to verify Vietnamese withdrawal." So, why don't we take Hun Sen up on his offer?

Answer. We have noted that Hun Sen in a message to the U.N. Secretary General September 27 invited the U.N. to send a "factfinding" mission to Cambodia "to control all questions of suspicion raised by the other factions after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia." It is important to note the difference between that offer and the proposal, supported by the overwhelming majority of participants at the Paris conference that a U.N.-sponsored international control mechanism/peacekeeping force be established in the context of a comprehensive Cambodian settlement. Neither Hanoi nor the Phnom Penh regime have agreed to that.

In the same message to the Secretary General, however, Hun Sen makes clear that the Phnom Penh regime remains intransigent on the key issue of powersharing. There is no offer to share power with any of the Cambodian factions during the crucial transitional period leading to elections. Genuine democratic elections under those circumstances are virtually inconceivable. The impasse on this issue is currently standing in the way of reaching a negotiated comprehensive settlement, and it is here that flexibility is required. In our view, a partial settlement, which is clearly what Hun Sen and Hanoi seek by inviting in a factfinding mission, would only mean continuing instability and escalating violence in Cambodia.

Question. We have asked both China and the Soviets to cut off arms supplies to both sides.

a. Have we asked the Soviets to ask the Chinese with whom they have improved relations since Gorbachev's visit to Beijing to cut off their supplies to the Khmer Rouge?

b. If we have, what has been the Soviet response?

Answer. As part of a comprehensive settlement, we support the cessation of arms supplies to all Cambodian factions. During recent discussions in Wyoming between Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the Soviets proposed a moratorium of all arms supplies which we are willing to pursue in the context of an overall settlement. Beijing has also agreed to that.

In the interest of averting the escalation of violence in Cambodia, we have urged both Moscow and Beijing to restrain the supplies of arms to their friends in Cambodia.

Question. During the Paris conference, did we raise as an agenda item with the Soviets and the Chinese, as well as the other major outside suppliers, a cutoff of all arms supplies in advance of a settlement?

Answer. No, we did not. The agenda set by the opening ministerial session of the conference called for the achievement of a comprehensive settlement. All of our efforts during the conference were directed toward that end.

Question.. U.S. officials are reported in a Washington Times article of September 22 as "all but dismiss(ing) the military wings" of the NCR.

a. Would agree with that report? If not, what makes the NCR effective? How do they recruit and train military and political cadres? What type of training do they receive? How far inside Cambodia do Sihanouk's and Son Sann's forces operate on a regular basis?

b. What reports do we have on corruption inside the ANS and KPNLF refugee camps inside Thailand?

Answer. a. No, we would not agree that military capabilities of the KPLNF and the ANS can be dismissed. Unfortunately, their military capabilities are less than those of the two Communist factions. In fact, both non-Communist factions have been improving their capabilities and are presently engaged—based on press reports—in operations as much as 25 to 30 kilometers inside Cambodia.

b. There have been numerous reports over the years of corruption within the camps in Thailand under the control of the two non-Communist Khmer factions, though U.N. authorities responsible for administering the camps have attempted to control it.

*Question.*Thai military intelligence are cited in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* as reporting that Hun Sen's forces are well-equipped but lack trained officers and have low morale. Is that our assessment too?

Answer. We have little authoritative information on the equipment or morale of Phnom Penh's forces. The Vietnamese did leave behind equipment, and there have been substantial recent Soviet shipments. Foreign journalists and other visitors to Cambodia during the Vietnamese withdrawal reported seeing PRK troops equipped with new weapons. Undoubtedly there is concern among the PRK leadership and its forces about their ability to withstand a major offensive without direct Vietnamese support, although public statements express confidence. Press reports suggest that some of the small units attacked by Khmer Rouge and KPNLF forces in recent weeks initially did not perform well, but we have not seen large scale defections by PRK troops.

Question. There are reports that guerrilla forces have plans to force the 300,000 or so civilians they control back inside Cambodia once they have captured base areas. According to an article in London's *The Independent,* military ranks have been given to engineers, construction workers and medics in the KPNLF camp at site 2 and at the Sihanouk camp of site B about 1,000 youths are reported to have been conscripted into the military.

Answer. We have been told on many occasions by the two non-Communist Khmer factions that they will neither force people in the camps along the Thai-Khmer border back into Cambodia nor conscript them into the army, but it is obviously a situation we will have to keep a close eye on. At present non-Communist civilians are relatively safe, and instead of being a burden to the fighting forces, are a source of support for them. Reports do suggest that recruitment efforts by all the factions, as well as the army in Phnom Penh, have been stepped up with renewed border fighting.

Responses of Mr. Lambertson to Questions Asked by Senator Robb

Question. You have said that the administration's position is to minimize the Khmer Rouge's role as much as possible, including in an interim arrangement. Can you elaborate on the administration's thinking about this.

a. Can you elaborate about the view of keeping the Khmer Rouge "within the tent" and "out of the tent" as a way of minimizing likelihood of a Khmer Rouge success in seeking to reestablish control of Cambodia.

b. What insights can you give us about the Khmer Rouge concerning how monolithic they are. One account has it that there are some 6,000 irredeemables. Others seem to think the entire Khmer Rouge is monolithic and can't be dealt with under any circumstances. It is your view that some in the ranks of the Khmer Rouge could peacefully and safely be reintegrated back into Cambodia society if there were a comprehensive settlement?

Answer. Our attitude and policy toward the Khmer Rouge has been unambiguous. We strongly prefer that they have no role at all in any future Cambodian government. We note, however, that our friends in the region, the ASEAN states and the non-Communist Cambodians led by Prince Sihanouk, who have the most vital stake in the Cambodian situation, believe it is necessary to include the KR in an interim

regime to prevent a civil war. In that context, we argue for the minimal role possible for the KR and emphasize that our ability to support any Cambodian government would be directly and inversely related to the degree of Khmer Rouge involvement in it, if any.

a. The "in the tent" argument holds that leaving the KR out of any settlement assures that this powerful military group will have no option but to direct the full weight of its armed strength against the established regime. While it recognizes that the KR, even inside a settlement, would probably work to undermine it, at least some restraints on its behavior would exist. For example, Beijing, which was considerable influence with the KR, would presumably be a signatory of any settlement and have an interest in helping to assure the KR's good behavior.

b. As with any large organization, there are factions and various levels of commitment within the Khmer Rouge. Nevertheless, it has been able to sustain a remarkable amount of influence and control over its core following. We have little information on the depth of loyalty, particularly among the younger generation. In the context of a comprehensive settlement, large portions of the rank-and-file could presumably be reintegrated into Khmer society, but it would be difficult to distinguish committed followers from the others. The leadership is another story. Basically, we believe that the leaders of the KR are the same group which carried out the brutalities of the 1970's and still remain committed to their radical social ideas. It is, therefore, crucial that any settlement contain concrete assurances that this murderous group can never return to power, and indeed, that key leaders are excluded from the political process.

Question. What would be the consequences of a "partial settlement" in Cambodia?

Answer. Although we are not wedded to the particular shape of any settlement, we do believe that it must be comprehensive and contain three major ingredients: International verification of a complete Vietnamese withdrawal; concrete assurances that the Khmer Rouge will not return to power, and; the establishment of a process leading to the fair exercise of self-determination by the Cambodian people.

A settlement lacking any of these elements would be inherently unstable and a recipe for a prolonged civil war, in which the KR victory cannot be ruled out.

Question. To what do you attribute Hun Sen's intransigence in the Paris Talks and unwillingness to negotiate over a true interim comprehensive settlement?

a What is Hun Sen's relationship with Hanoi? Can Hanoi exercise considerable leverage over Hun Sen in the negotiations with the NCR?

Answer. Phnom Penh and Hanoi's intransigence on the powersharing issue at Paris was unfortunate, but not surprising. Although they have indicated willingness to provide cosmetic, symbolic positions to Sihanouk and other members of the resistance, they have never offered a real powersharing proposal. Their position on an interim administration which would guide the country to elections was most recently expressed by the Vietnamese representative to the UN, when he said:

"Vietnam supports the petition of the State of Cambodia whereby during a transitional period from the total Vietnamese withdrawal to the general elections, the political and military status quo should be maintained in Cambodia and an on-the-spot cease-fire observed between the two opposing Cambodian forces. Only the Cambodian people can, through internationally controlled, modify this status quo and choose their political regime according to their own wishes."

We, and most of the other participants at the Paris conference, believe that it would not be possible to hold genuine elections under the PRK administration and, therefore, support the formation of an interim coalition under Prince Sihanouk's leadership.

a. Hun Sen was installed and maintained in his present position by Hanoi and the evidence suggests he has been a loyal executor of Hanoi's will. How pliant he will be in the future is difficult to say. Over time, in the absence of Vietnamese troops and with his own links to Moscow for military and economic aid and enhanced relations with Thailand or others in Southeast Asia, Hun Sen possibly could become less responsive to Hanoi. Indeed, domestic pressures should encourage him to distance himself from the Vietnamese. In any case, Hun Sen may be more resistant to compromise with the non-Communists than his backers in Hanoi; after all, he has more to lose.

Question. What is Hun Sen's background, and your assessment of him as a leader, and also whether he is a Communist or a nationalist?

a What is his relationship with Heng Samrin and Chea Sim? Is Hun Sen the primary arbiter in Cambodia of policymaking, or do these other individuals factor in significantly? If so, how so?

Answer. Hun Sen is from a middle-class background and joined the Khmer Rouge in the early 1970's. He became a deputy regimental commander of a region in the

eastern zone of Cambodia. When, in 1977, the central Khmer Rouge authorities began a purge of the eastern zone, he fled to Vietnam. Hun Sen says he is a Communist. In protocol terms, he is a third ranking member of the Politburo of a Marxist-Leninist party. How deep his commitment runs is another matter; certainly he seems to be more of a pragmatic Communist than one of the rigidly orthodox variety. Whether he is also a nationalist is difficult to say. He has made some anti-Vietnamese remarks to foreign visitors, and in order to improve his legitimacy at home, he is likely to appear to distance himself from the Vietnamese in the future.

a. The leadership of the Phnom Penh regime appears to be oligarchical and Heng Samrin, Chea Sim, and Hun Sen, seem to be the principal leaders. There are reports, which cannot be verified, that Chea Sim and Heng Samrin take a more orthodox approach than Hun Sen and are leery of policies which might diminish Communist party authority for the sake of enticing Sihanouk. Hun Sen has become the regime's most important and visible international spokesman. But he may be no more powerful than his two colleagues, and all of them must also take into account the views of the other members of the party Politburo.

Question. I recognize that information about Vietnamese being left behind in Cambodia is still sketchy at this point. But in terms of the historic nationalistic rivalry between the Khmer people and the Vietnamese, if there are still remnants of Vietnamese influence over Cambodia or settlers left behind, what are the policy implications in terms of fueling continued conflict and/or impeding negotiations?

Answer. We don't really have hard information on the question of Vietnamese being left behind in Cambodia, but recognize that the Vietnamese settlers issue is of great concern to Prince Sihanouk and the non-Communist Cambodians and would have to be dealt with in the context of a comprehensive settlement.

Hostility between Cambodians and Vietnamese is a historic fact which has been exacerbated by Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. This history certainly makes the negotiating environment more difficult.

Question. What are the estimates you can give of Soviet and Vietnamese military assistance going to the Hun Sen government over the last 5 years? In the last year?

Answer. Vietnamese military assistance is impossible to quantify. The hardware they gave the PRK was originally from leftover Vietnam war stocks as well as the Soviet Union, but they obviously made a decisive contribution to the establishment and survival of the Phnom Penh regime in maintaining their occupation force in Cambodia and in creating and training the PRK'S military. Soviet materiel assistance to Phnom Penh in the last 5 years is estimated at over $1.8 billion in 1989 dollars. According to the 1988 issue of ACDA "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers," Cambodia imported (almost entirely from the Soviet Union) the following amounts of arms (in millions of 1987 dollars): 1983, $159; 1984, $208; 1985, $207; 1986, $150; and 1987, $350. In 1988 it imported less than in 1987, but this year's Soviet assistance is already higher than it was in 1987.

Question. What about Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge in the last 5 years? In the last year?

Answer. As best we can estimate, Chinese materiel assistance to the Khmer Rouge has been less than on-tenth that of the Soviets to the PRK. Their level of assistance does not appear to have changed significantly this year.

Question. What about U.S. support for the NCR in the last 5 years? In the last year?

Answer. U.S. assistance to the non-Communist resistance has ranged from $3.85 to $5.5 million per year during the past 4 years. We are hoping to increase that assistance this year in order to strengthen the positions of Prince Sihanouk and the non-Communist Cambodians in dealing with the Phnom Penh regime and to allow them to defend themselves in the event of a conflict with the Khmer Rouge. Our purpose in doing so is to enhance prospects for a negotiated, political settlement, which requires that the NCR and Sihanouk play key roles.

Question. If there were a consensus in Congress about U.S. military assistance to the non-Communists, in your view would it be desirable to provide such aid? If so, why?

a. What are some of the safeguards and appropriate oversight that could be built into such a program to relieve anxieties that such aid would not fall into the Khmer Rouge's hands or be subject to graft?

Answer. Up to now, our assistance to the non-Communist resistance has included only nonlethal aid. With the increasing pace of negotiations following on the momentum established by the Paris conference, we believe it is even more crucial that we continue our assistance to enhance the status and capability of the non-Communist Cambodian groups and Prince Sihanouk. it is particularly important that the non-Communists be able to hold their own against the two Communist factions.

The quantity and type of assistance we provide to the NCR is under continuing review.

a. All of our aid programs are operated under as strict control as possible to assure that the assistance is not misused. Tight accounting procedures as well as other physical control methods are employed. We have also stressed that our ability to support any future Cambodian government would be inversely and directly related to the degree of Khmer Rouge participation, if any, in it.

Question. Discuss the role that the United States is playing in seeking to end external supplies to the various parties in Cambodia.

Answer. As I noted in answer to a previous question, the United States at Paris supported a comprehensive settlement which would have included a complete cessation of the supply of arms to the Cambodian factions. At the recent meeting in Wyoming with Secretary Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, they announced their willingness to join others in ceasing arms aid to the Cambodian factions in the context of a comprehensive settlement.

To avert the escalation of violence in Cambodia, the United States has urged restraint on both Moscow and Beijing in terms of supplying arms to their friends in Cambodia.

Question. Under what circumstances is the administration prepared to consider economic aid if progress is made toward a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia and there is a complete, verified withdrawal by the Vietnamese.

Answer. We made clear at the Paris conference that we were prepared to join an international effort aimed at the reconstruction of Cambodia and the voluntary repatriation of displaced Cambodians once a comprehensive solution to the conflict was achieve.

Senator CRANSTON. I have one other question that I would like to ask you.

While Pol Pot has allegedly resigned from all leadership posts, a Thai military intelligence report cited in the Far Eastern Economic Review states that he has returned to military leadership and is now operating from a Khmer Rouge refugee camp near the border. Do you know if that is accurate?

Mr. LAMBERTSON. I do not know of Pol Pot's whereabouts, but we have never given any particular credit to the Khmer Rouge assertion that Pol Pot has retired.

We regard Pol Pot as the leader of the Khmer Rouge. We regard him as one of the key figures who under any scenario should have no role in any political process in Cambodia.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. LAMBERTSON. Thank you, sir.

Senator CRANSTON. It has been a pleasure to have you with us.

We will now go to public panel No. 1, consisting of Mr. Dith Pran, photographer for the New York Times, Dr. Hang Ngor, actor in the movie "The Killing Fields," and Mr. Kassie Neou of McLean, VA.

In order to allow time for questioning, I would appreciate it if each of you would give your verbal testimony in summary of not more than 5 minutes. Any full statements will appear in the record as if read.

Shall we start with you, Mr. Pran?

STATEMENT OF DITH PRAN, PHOTOGRAPHER, NEW YORK TIMES

Mr. PRAN. Mr. Chairman, my name is Dith Pran. I am a photographer for the New York Times. My story is told in "The Killing Fields" motion picture. I have recently been back to Cambodia and to the Thai-Cambodian border as part of a human rights mission.

Since the Vietnamese troops left Cambodia last week, the Cambodian civil war is already in effect. All armies are pressing under-

age youths into their armies. All sides are sending their troops to crush the enemy—which are all Cambodians. Cambodians are being forced by their leaders to go to the killing fields again.

The international community must use its influence immediately to stop it and pressure the Cambodians to come to the table again. My suggestion is that I would like to see the two non-Communist groups separate themselves from the Khmer Rouge and receive full diplomatic support from the democratic countries.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to see the United States not go along with the idea of trying to bring the Khmer Rouge back to the future coalition government in Phnom Penh. I did not hear that Presidents Roosevelt and Truman wanted high members of the Nazis joining the new German Government.

The high Nazi leaders were put on trial for their crimes against humanity. Why not the Khmer Rouge high command? Is this because the Second World War Holocaust was European and we are from a small country in Asia?

I still do not understand why the United Nations General Assembly does not pass a resolution providing that those who are responsible for the Cambodian genocide should not be returned to political or state power. The Khmer Rouge flag has been flying outside the United Nations for 14 years now. Why does no one want to deal with this?

I do not believe that the world would let the Nazi swastika fly outside the United Nations. Why does the world let the highest ranking Khmer Rouge like Khieu Samphan, the chairman of the Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea under Khmer Rouge rule, come to the United Nations in New York?

All I can do is speak out and hope and pray that all Cambodian soldiers, including Khmer Rouge, will refuse to fight and will stop killing each other.

Mr. Chairman, please help bring peace for the Cambodian people. Thank you very much for allowing me to share my view with you today.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. Dr. Ngor.

STATEMENT OF HAING S. NGOR, M.D., LOS ANGELES, CA

Dr. NGOR. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Dr. Haing S. Ngor. I received an Academy Award for playing the role of Dith Pran in "The Killing Fields" motion picture. I am also a survivor of the Khmer Rouge genocide. My own story is told in my autobiography, "A Cambodian Odyssey."

Last month I returned to Cambodia for the first time since 1979 as part of a human rights investigation. I also went to Paris to talk to participants in the Cambodian negotiations. A full report on our mission will be available soon.

I thank you for allowing me to make several points now, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, first, Cambodian people inside and outside Cambodia do not want to see the Khmer Rouge return to seize power in Cambodia again. Please, I want to say to the United States, "Do

not support any plan to put the Khmer Rouge back in the Cambodian Government."

Please do not believe that putting the Khmer Rouge back into the government will make them behave. Just look at how the Khmer Rouge treat the people under their control in the camps in Thailand. The tiger has not changed its stripes.

Do not believe that if you put the Khmer Rouge back in the Cambodian Government China will restrain the Khmer Rouge. The Chinese Communist Government massacres the Chinese people even on international television. Why do you think that China would stop the Cambodian Communists from killing the Cambodian peoples?

Do you believe that if you put the Khmer Rouge back in the Cambodian Government the United States will make the Khmer Rouge behave. Even if the United Nations goes into the villages, the Khmer Rouge will kill in the fields. If the United Nations is present by day, the Khmer Rouge will kill by night.

The United Nations did nothing against the Khmer Rouge the first time the Communists ruled Cambodia and killed millions of Cambodians. Do not believe that if you put Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge back in the Cambodian Government the non-Communists can make the Khmer Rouge behave.

Non-Communists are only useful to the Khmer Rouge and respected by the Khmer Rouge when they lend the Khmer Rouge the use of their names when the Khmer Rouge are trying to get power.

Do not believe that if you put Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge back in the Cambodian Government this is the way to avoid a civil war. If you put the Khmer Rouge back in the government, according to the China-Khmer Rouge-CGDK plan, you will only succeed in spreading the civil war from the Thai-Cambodia border and jungle mountain ranges to the rice-growing plain and the city.

I hope you will look closely at the China-Khmer Rouge-CGDK plan. It would put the Khmer Rouge back in the army and the police and the prison system via the ministries of defense and interior and into the villages and districts and local governments and administrations at all levels, top to bottom.

I want to know, why does the United States agree to put the Khmer Rouge back into the Cambodian Government? This is a terrible fate for our Cambodian people. I want to know why the world still ignores Cambodia, why the world still will not stop and lift its own finger to stop the killing in Cambodia?

Last October 18, President Reagan signed into law Public Law 100–502, the joint congressional resolution, House Joint Resolution 602, passed by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. This made the Cambodian people living in the United States very, very happy.

Public Law 100–502: "In support of the restoration of a free and independent Cambodia, the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the protection of the Cambodian people from a return to power by the genocidal Khmer Rouge" declared that the United States, in cooperation with the international community, should use all appropriate means available to prevent a return to power of Pol Pot, the top echelon of the Khmer Rouge and their armed forces, so that the Cambodian people might be free to pursue self-determina-

tion without the specter of the coercion, intimidation, and torture that are known elements of Khmer Rouge ideology.

I would like to know, why does U.S. policy not stick to that law signed by President Reagan? From what I have learned, the United States supports the plan to put Pol Pot's, Khieu Samphan, Hun Sen's, and Ta Mok's Khmer Rouge killers and murders and torturers back into Cambodia and to include the Khmer Rouge in the ministry of defense and interior, the ministries that run the army, police, and prisons.

Mr. Chairman, as a torture victim and survivor of the Khmer Rouge prison-execution centers, I hope the United States will not support a plan that seeks to put the Khmer Rouge back in the Cambodian Government, even including the ministry of interior.

Please, help us to bring peace in Cambodia, Mr. Chairman. People would be very grateful in Cambodia.

Thank you very much.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. Mr. Neou.

STATEMENT OF KASSIE NEOU, McLEAN, VA

Mr. NEOU. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Kassie Neou. I am a human rights advocate with the Cambodia Documentation Commission. I am also the chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Cambodian Network Council.

Mr. Chairman, I talked to many of my fellow Cambodian Americans who appear to be your constituents. They spoke very well of you. They admire your effort and your concern in the plight of the Cambodian people and the fate of Cambodia as a country. I share the same view.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. NEOU. I recently visited Cambodia and the refugee camps in Thailand on a human rights investigation. Right now, the Cambodian people face a civil war on the wrong terms being waged on behalf a grossly misguided proposal advertised as a plan to prevent civil war.

The present alliance of the non-Communist resistance with the Khmer Rouge to fight the Vietnamese-installed regime of Hun Sen in order to force the Phnom Penh political authorities to include Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge in the ministries of defense and interior is a disastrous situation for the Cambodian people.

From my discussions with Cambodians in villages, provinces, and the capital city of Phnom Penh, I can tell you that Cambodians do not want the Khmer Rouge to be returned to power as part of the Cambodian Government.

The plan to put the Khmer Rouge back into the Cambodian Government, including the Orwellian euphemism put forward by China, ASEAN, and the Khmer Rouge as a comprehensive solution will not bring peace and stability to Cambodia or to the region of Southeast Asia.

Rather, it would spread civil war to more places and put the Khmer Rouge in a more advantageous position to take even more power.

There is no evidence that the Khmer Rouge will not fight armed struggle no matter what. I interviewed a number of Cambodians in

Thailand who had recently escaped from the Khmer Rouge camp. According to what I heard, Pol Pot is still actively in the command of the Khmer Rouge. According to what these refugees told me, those still under the Khmer Rouge control were being told to prepare to fight, regardless of what happened at the Paris conference.

What needs to be done is that a situation must be constructed which will marginalize the Khmer Rouge, that will minimize the material and de facto international support for the Khmer Rouge and will encourage the maximum number of the Khmer Rouge cadre and fighters to give up, retire, or defect, like what has been happening every day, so that all that is left to wage war against the Cambodian people is a remnant hardcore that cannot succeed and that can be isolated.

But right now, I cannot really see that many countries are acting to marginalize the Khmer Rouge. China, Thailand, and Singapore still back the Khmer Rouge, regardless of the Vietnamese withdrawal. The non-Communist resistance is still allied with the Khmer Rouge.

The United Nations continues to feed the Khmer Rouge army. The international community does not stipulate or demand the removal and exile of the Khmer Rouge leadership. The United States supports a plan to bring the Khmer Rouge back to partial power.

With all of this backing and support, the Khmer Rouge will remain full of confidence, thinking they can win, and the Khmer people will continue to suffer for this.

I have three recommendations for U.S. policy to marginalize the Khmer Rouge in the current situation. First, the United States should support the non-Communist resistance to end their alliance with the Khmer Rouge.

It is urgent for the non-Communist resistance to undertake negotiation with the Hun Sen side, not as is presently the case, in order to achieve Khmer Rouge involvement at all levels of government from top to bottom, which Cambodians inside Cambodia definitely do not want, but in order to obtain freedoms and democracy, which many Cambodians I talked to want very much, and in order to obtain the national unity and cohesion necessary to protect the Cambodian people from the return to power by Pol Pot.

Of course, if the non-Communist resistance undertook negotiations for these purposes, they would lose support from China. What great power would then support them if not the United States?

Why must the United States support for the non-Communist resistance be linked to the non-Communist resistance going along with China's desire for Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge to return to power. The United States should recondition the terms of its support for the NCR.

Second, the United States should, as is declared in the joint congressional resolution signed into law by President Reagan, seek support for resolutions in the international community to include the provision that those responsible for massive violations of internationally recognized human rights including genocide, should not be allowed to return to positions of political or state power. Anything less is not consistent with the intent, even the letter, of the genocide convention which President Reagan also signed into law.

The United States should pay close attention to the Cambodian resolution at the U.N. General Assembly because the way it will probably be worded this year, the practical meaning will be that it is quite acceptable for the Khmer Rouge to return to power as long as they do not resume unspecified practice and vaguely referenced policies.

My third recommendation is similar. The United States should approach Cambodia policy from the viewpoint and obligations of the genocide convention, which the United States ratified last year.

Of course, I strongly agree with the opinion of Representative Jim Leach that the United States should take action to bring to justice those responsible for the Cambodian genocide.

I also want something more simple. Prof. Elie Wiesel said that when governments seek to destroy a people, they must kill twice: first, the persons, then the memory. There is a concerted international effort to deny the Cambodian genocide.

I would like the United States to oppose the activities of some countries to cover up and lie about the Cambodian genocide.

Stemming from the first Cambodian negotiations at Jakarta there had been an explicit link between the Vietnamese withdrawal and the prevention of the return to power of the genocidal regime. But, with Vietnam about to undertake withdrawal, no doubt coincident with a concerted effort to return the Khmer Rouge, there was also a concerted effort to remove references to the Cambodian genocide at the international negotiations.

At the Paris conference when China and the Khmer Rouge with other supporters tried hard to remove and prevent any reference to the Cambodian genocide, according to several sources we have talked with, neither the United States nor the other Western democracies really made objection to these calculated and blatant attempts to rewrote Cambodian history and sell the world on a big lie.

Like the other Cambodians now in America, I witnessed the virtually complete destruction of our people's beloved Buddhist monks, Cambodia's major religious group. That was genocide.

I also witnessed the substantial destruction of some of Cambodian ethnic minority groups, particular a group they call the Cham. That was also genocide. And the Khmer Rouge planned and succeeded to destroy a large part of the Cambodian population deemed to be irremediably tainted by feudal, bourgeois, or foreign associations.

The French call this autogenocide, Pol Pot's unique contribution to the barbarism of the 20th century. Legal scholars we have talked to say that this is what the genocide convention refers to as the partial destruction of the Cambodian national group itself.

Because the Khmer Rouge overheard me to speak English, I was taken to the district level prison extermination center at Koch Ro Teh in Battambang Province. Five times I was tortured unconscious to make me falsely confess to being CIA. I am one of the very few survivors of that place, and there were hundreds and hundreds of places like Koch Ro Teh, places we now call killing fields.

As a survivor of the Cambodian genocide and now a U.S. citizen, I am worried and disturbed. It disturbs me that at Paris the United

States made little effort to prevent or object to the denial of the Khmer Rouge genocide.

The joint congressional resolution on Cambodia which President Reagan signed into law last October, "declares that the United states must remain vigilant to ensure that genocide is never tolerated or forgotten anywhere in the world and that those responsible should for such heinous crimes be held accountable under international law as prescribed to by the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide."

Can I ask the members of this committee to do all you can to make sure the administration conducts its policy toward Cambodia according to the provisions and obligations of the genocide convention?

I again thank you, Mr. Chairman, and all member of the committee.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. The testimony we have heard from survivors of the Khmer Rouge is very impressive, very shocking, and I think puts a heavy burden on our country to try to figure out ways to be a constructive force in the situation there, something that I am afraid that we are not doing at the present time.

Let me put one question to whoever chooses to answer, and then I would solicit amplification or comment or expression of a difference of opinion, if you have one. What do you feel is the best response to the administration's position that if we do not have the Khmer Rouge involved in the settlement and involved in the government, that ensures that they will fight that government and it ensures that the civil war will then go on? What is the answer to that?

Mr. NEOU. Mr. Chairman, could you say that again, please.

Senator CRANSTON. the administration's position appears to be that while they opposed the Khmer Rouge, if the Khmer Rouge is not involved in the settlement and does not have a role in the government that emerges out of a settlement if one does, if it is not there, then it will fight, and that will ensure a civil war. What is the answer? What is the response to that administration position?

Mr. NEOU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to answer that question.

The Khmer Rouge are fighting now, according to information from my sources interviewed. No matter what the outcome of the Paris talks is, they will still be fighting.

What they told their soldiers, especially in the area controlled directly by Pol Pot, which is west of Thailand, down south to Trok where Pol Pot lives with his new young wife, they said we still keep on fighting and to own the house alone, which means to seize power alone.

The second point is that they will not share the power with anyone. First, they will eradicate the traitors Hun Sen and what they call the Vietnamese puppet. Second, they do not trust the capitalists imperialist American puppet, Prime Minister Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk. They accuse the NCR's that way, too, which means the idea of the administration in trying to include the KR's is not the right idea.

The second point is that the Cambodian inside Cambodia, they think it is going backward to get the Khmer Rouge to power. So far, they believe they have stepped forward this much, 1 inch, which means switching from the genocide of Pol Pot to the Communist regime of Hun Sen, but they long for more than that. They long for a look forward to genuine peace and freedom which means they long to see the return of the non-Communist faction because they hope that they will regain their freedom by having these non-Communist resistance people.

But, in order to do so, the question remains to be answered who will support Prince Norodhan Sihanouk and Prime Minister Son Sann? They cannot break away from the Khmer Rouge as they are now. It is going to be a suicide because it is impossible for the freedom fighters to go into Phnom Penh or elsewhere to stand in between the two powerful devils. Hun Sen is also a devil. The Khmer Rouge are the devil, too.

And in order for these people to be able to protect the Cambodians and to achieve peace and restore independence, they are going to be strong enough.

I am not going to say what it means, but they must be strong enough to do so.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, is there any solution, then, to the civil war except the defeat of the Khmer Rouge since they are fighting now and intend to continue to fight?

And I suppose that would then imply that that would be best brought about if there was a cutoff of arms to the Khmer Rouge by those supplying them, namely the People's Republic primarily and aid to the forces from elsewhere that are fighting or opposed to the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. NEOU. Well, let me start by saying this. My formula after I came back from Cambodia in talking to even government officials down to taxicab drivers and peasants, the hope is that civil war will not last long as it or it has been going now.

If the NCR is back inside Cambodia, one, because in the early seventies the Khmer Rouge grew fast because of popular support to Prince Norodhan Sihanouk. At that time the Prince was left no choice but to stay with that side.

This time if the Prince—if someone can arrange for the Prince to be on the other side, the side of the people in Cambodia, the people will then support the Prince instead, and then the Khmer Rouge will gain no more support. Right now every day the Khmer Rouge are going home.

On my trip back from Phnom Penh to Saigon by Ran, crossing the river at Nat Lu, I talked to a number of PRK guards trying to find out what is going on. They laughed at us and said "Well, the Khmer Rouge are coming home every day. They jump over and they come home. They said 'They are fed up.' They do not trust the Khmer Rouge anymore, and they want just to go home."

So, my solution is if the Prince stays outside and the NCR of Prime Minister Son Sann stays outside, there will still be suffering, suffering still continues. It is nothing to stop the Khmer Rouge.

But if the NCR's are arranged to be inside, I do not mean to go to recognize their puppet government of Hun Sen, but something can be arranged so that Hun Sen can step up with a kind of conces-

sion that is acceptable by the non-Communist resistance and there will be hope that the NCR will gain great support from the people, even though soldiers in the ring of the PRK now, they long for the same thing. The working class group longs for the same thing, except a few of the politburos on top, Hun Sen, Chi Samm, et cetera, et cetera.

But the others, they long for peace and freedom.

Senator CRANSTON. Do either of you have a comment on that?

Dr. NGOR. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for giving the floor to me.

I would like to mention a little bit that we Cambodian people have seen too much suffering in two decades already. The civil war since before the Sihanouk regime since 1967.

Now that the tigers are in a cage, and I hope the U.S. Government should keep their tigers in their cage, do not let their tigers get out from their cage.

And the United States Government should put on political pressure to China, let China exile and China must exile those top leaders to China.

As long as the Khmer Rouge exists in Cambodia, we have no hope for peace in Cambodia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you.

Do you have any comment on the question that I asked, Mr. Pran?

Mr. PRAN. Well, I think if the two non-Communists have a chance to work with the Hun Sen government, I think that the Khmer Rouge could grow weaker and like Kassie Neou said, the Khmer Rouge soldiers will as long as they heard that Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann are joining with the Hun Sen, working together to find a way of how to find peace, democracy, and neutral policy—I am sure, then, the Khmer Rouge would grow weaker, and weaker because we get a lot of popularity from the two non-Communist regimes and joining together with the regime in Phnom Penh and work it out how to face only one faction.

So, thank you. That is my view on this.

Mr. NEOU. Mr. Chairman, may I make one last point?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Mr. NEOU. The term pressure that my colleagues Dr. Haing Ngor just said, I somehow oppose that term. I would like the United States to make a deal instead of to make pressure because pressuring a friend might risk losing the relationship.

I, as an American—America is my country—I would like the United States to stay on good terms with China, but to make a new deal with China the same way Thailand made a deal with China in 1978. Hey, if China wants the United States to do something, we will do it. But in return, you have got to take away the leadership group of Pol Pot.

So, can Cambodia achieve a genuine peace? I would just suggest that do not pressure China, but try to engage in quite a new deal. Thank you.

Senator CRANSTON. Mr. Pran, in your September 24 article in the New York Times you said you were not satisfied with many of Hun Sen's answers to your questions. What specifically did not satisfy you?

Mr. PRAN. Well, we like to see the conditions in prison, and we were not allowed to. That is the main thing, that we are interested in trying to investigate the human rights violations.

That was part of our mission, why we were there, because we wanted to make sure that the current government, the Hun Sen government, also respects human rights. So that you can see when we want to——

Senator CRANSTON. Would you excuse me for just one moment. There is a phone call that I absolutely must take, but I will be right back. We will suspend for just a moment. [Pause.]

Senator CRANSTON. All right, we will reconvene. Forgive me for interrupting you.

Mr. PRAN. Well, what I am saying is that I am not satisfied. The whole thing that we all discussed with Hun Sen, because we would have liked to have seen the conditions in the prison and also in my interviews with some of the Cambodian people, they say that the countryside still has some kind of torturing system.

So, that is part of why I am not satisfied. And that is what I wrote.

Senator CRANSTON. What is your appraisal of the Hun Sen government? How effective is it? How much in control is it, where it has physical control? And what about its view on human rights?

Mr. PRAN. Well, you know, it is sad that Cambodia is still behind the times, but we see something changing. Because when we left everything was empty. And that is a part of what the current government is doing for the country. But I am still not happy because the civil war—or the war is still going on. Cambodia is still poor. We hope that all of the Cambodian leaders would agree and try to rebuild the country.

I am angry when I see my country, that we are so far away from the situation in the outside world, that we would like to see the Cambodian leaders change their minds quickly and just say that is enough. We must join together and rebuild our country back and put Cambodia into the neutral policy like we used to have in the 1950's and the 1960's.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very, very much.

Mr. Ngor, in your testimony, you say that the China/Khmer Rouge CGDK plan would put the Khmer Rouge back in the army and the police and prison system via the ministries of defense and interior. What is your evidence that that is the specific nature of the plan?

Dr. NGOR. I think that the CGDK and basically the Khmer Rouge want to have that kind of position, because the Khmer Rouge would like very much to hold that kind of ministry of defense and interior.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, of course they would want that, but has that been agreed to by the other parties?

Dr. NGOR. Because if you give that role to the Khmer Rouge, the killing fields will be in Cambodia again.

Senator CRANSTON. Well, certainly. But has that been agreed to by the other parties? Is China backing that plan? Is Sihanouk backing that plan that the Khmer Rouge would get defense and interior?

Dr. NGOR. Can you repeat that last question?

Senator CRANSTON. Are the People's Republic and is Sihanouk specifically supporting a coalition government where the Khmer would have control of interior and defense?

Dr. NGOR. You mean like another faction or what?

Senator CRANSTON. As you suggested; have they agreed to that?

Dr. NGOR. I do not think that the Hun Sen government agreed for that kind of role.

Senator CRANSTON. Press reports suggest that Khmer nationalism remains strong even among those charged with being Vietnamese puppets, like Hun Sen is charged. How hostile do you think Hun Sen is to Vietnam and how independent is he of Vietnam?

Dr. NGOR. Mr. Chairman, I would like to give you a little bit of the background of the Cambodian people. The Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge are our enemies. So, like the Vietnamese, the Khmer Rouge know exactly that they are our enemies. And we and the Khmer people are like oil and water. We cannot mix together.

And now that you know exactly that the Vietnamese pack everything to leave Cambodia. But the world still does not know and never pays attention. How about the Khmer Rouge pack everything to return to Cambodia to seize power?

And these two parts, we know exactly that the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese are our enemy. And we have to protect and do not let the Khmer Rouge back to power.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Neou, how popular do you think the Hun Sen government now is inside Cambodia?

Mr. NEOU. Mr. Chairman, I listened to Hun Sen talk for nearly two hours with the whole delegation. I found the man is young and bright, very articulate, a good talker, but also a big liar. Because we were invited to see it for real and we were denied access to go to see things that we wanted to see for real. We were told lies about many things. We were supposed to see the minister of interior, and then at the last minute it was canceled, and blah, blah, blah.

Also I found that Hun Sen does not have freedom of speech because he was put to power——

Senator CRANSTON. He does not have what?

Mr. NEOU. He does not have freedom of speech. Everything he says must be tightly framed, according to my conversations with some of his staff.

Senator CRANSTON. Framed by whom?

Mr. NEOU. Pardon?

Senator CRANSTON. Framed by whom?

Mr. NEOU. Framed by somebody behind the scene. It must be members of the politburo or somebody else higher; namely the Vietnamese authority.

Popularity to the people? I did ask people along the street about this: Do you like Hun Sen? They said "What, from Pol Pot to Hun Sen? What is the difference?" I said "Yes, how about now? You can come back home, you have this, you have that, you have clothes, you have everything in the street, unlike before." They said, "What is this? We still have no freedoms. We are allowed to go back to our homeland, but our farmland has been taken away by somebody else affiliated with the authorities." At least we have a

piece of land elsewhere, like my uncle, the sole survivor. He said "This is it. It is a piece of land, and we cannot move around to do farming elsewhere."

Religious freedom? The constitution says yes, religion, the Buddhist religion is considered as the state religion. On my way to my home village I stopped near a temple, a remnant of the war still in existence. I asked an old man and I said, "Uncle, it is nice to have the pagoda here and there," and then what happened? There is no monk.

What do you mean?

Well, I do not see any monks. And people are supposed to be allowed to enter the monkhood.

He said "Yes, if you have the money."

I said "What is the difference? I mean, if you want to go back into the monkhood, you go to apply to get approval from village level, district, higher and higher, five different levels to the top. And then for each approval, you have got to have some kind of fair amount of cash to shake hands"—what they call it.

So, at least one who wants to enter the monkhood must have at least 20,000 rials to become a monk.

So, this is an indirect pressure to people not to allow too many monks in Cambodia.

I found that he does not have much popularity. People do not trust each other. Out of one meeting we shook hands to say goodbye, in the palm of one of our members was a secret letter saying that like birds flying in the clouds, like fish swimming in water, and like snake crawling on rocks, the last line, disappearance without trace continues everyday.

Which means not too much different from Pol Pot. Pol Pot created the killing fields, but Hun Sen created mass disappearance everyday. So, there is no sign of popularity. People are a little bit happy compared with Pol Pot. But people long for more than that, as I just said.

Corruption is everywhere, Mr. Chairman, from lower level to upper levels.

I was a former member of the department of education. I was concerned about the education. I talked to a number of students. They said yes, students can work hard and pass the exam, but you have got to shake hands in order to get a chair in a classroom. And how much for that chair? The price is between 10,000 to 15,000 rials.

Which means children of the poor cannot pursue their higher education. Right now there is a saying in the Cambodian community under the Hun Sen regime that says children of the poor have to join the army; children of the wealthy become police officers; and children of the cadres go abroad for higher education.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. You three have been very, very helpful, and I appreciate your coming here to do your best to be constructive, as will we.

We now go to our final panel consisting of Frederick Z. Brown of Washington; Ken Conboy of the Heritage Foundation; and Richard Childress, president, Asian Investment Strategies.

We are beginning to develop a time problem, so I would appreciate it if you could each be as brief as possible in your presentations, and watch the lights here. There is a 5-minute limit. If you can do it faster, so I can ask more questions, I would appreciate it.

And if you would start, Mr. Brown, and try to summarize in 5 minutes or less.

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK Z. BROWN, SPECIALIST ON SOUTHEAST ASIA, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee on U.S. relations with Indochina. I have submitted a written statement for the record, and I would like now to summarize some of my main points:

I think the main theme of my testimony is that a preoccupation with the trauma of a painful involvement a generation ago, should not obscure today's realities or preclude thoughtful consideration of a new relationship with the three countries of Indochina.

In the interest of time, let me move immediately to the Cambodia question.

The roots of our dilemma today go back many years. After the 1978 Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, the United States began providing financial support to the non-Communist resistance, the NCR.

We permitted Thailand and others to carry out the actual organization, sustenance, and strengthening of the resistance forces.

In 1982 ASEAN-sponsored creation of the coalition government of Kampuchea, the CGDK, to create pressure on Vietnam, and force it to abandon its doctrine of irreversibility in Cambodia.

China, with United States approval, poured resources into the Khmer Rouge. The idea was not to defeat Vietnam, militarily, but to use the CGDK's presence and pressure to drive Hanoi to the negotiating table.

ASEAN's objective was not to install a democracy or a pluralism in Cambodia but to punish Vietnam's aggression, and the American economic and trade embargo certainly played a crucial role in this effort.

The non-Communists, under Sihanouk and Son Sann, it was hoped, would become strong enough to hold their own, whatever than meant. Whether they would ever be able to dominate the CGDK and take the political lead in the future of government in Phnom Penh was left vague. The Khmer Rouge were to be the cutting edge.

Now, in one sense, ASEAN's policy of punishing Vietnamese aggression and rejecting irreversibility has been remarkably successful, in that Vietnam has terminated its military occupation.

Unfortunately, neither ASEAN nor the United States did what was necessary to make the NCR genuine contenders militarily or politically.

The NCR's leaders were divided among themselves, unsure of their purpose, deficient in the professional skills of insurgency and, all too often, corrupt.

But perhaps most significant, the tough questions about the organization, leadership, motivation and, most crucial, the objectives of the NCR, were not addressed.

Compared with its two rivals today, the NCR has not evolved into a viable political alternative in a future Phnom Penh government, to be achieved through political negotiations.

So, in 1989, the U.S. policy finds itself espousing public support for an entity which has limited capability to defend itself militarily or politically in a rough-and-tumble fight on new terrain.

Since Paris, it apparently is in an even closer alliance with the loathsome Khmer Rouge.

Now, is it too late for the NCR to mold itself into a viable alternative to both the Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen regime?

It seems to me we have to take a good, hard look at what the United States wants in Cambodia and what, realistically, we can expect to achieve.

We talk of the NCR as a third alternative to Khmer Rouge on the PRK, as if it were some powerful, unified force and being.

Now, Sihanouk, is a figure around whom Khmer nationalism might well coalesce to build a new society, but are there other NCR leaders and cadres who could effectively share power with Hun Sen's team, and compete in the political military infighting with the Khmer Rouge?

What political apparatus at administrative structure do Sihanouk and the NCR have to put into place in Cambodia?

Does the entire non-Communist cause depend on Sihanouk? If we rely so heavily on him, should we not ask what happens to the NCR, if and when he departs the scene?

We talk of a time of testing during the coming dry season. What military strategy will the NCR pursue in the coming months? Is it to capture, and perhaps hold for a while, Pailin, Sisaphong, Battambang, or even Siem Riep? But how can an effective military strategy be pursued either to overthrow the PRK or to drive it and Vietnam back to the negotiating table without close coordination with the Khmer Rouge?

What we should worry about, it seems to me, is the Cambodian people, not just the NCR. And we should design our long-term policy in those terms.

Let me conclude by offering some thoughts on future U.S./Indochina policy.

First, we should raise the geopolitical priority assigned Indochina in our foreign policy councils, and stop viewing the subregion as some sort of diseased appendage to Southeast Asia, with small significance to U.S. interest. At the same time, we should maintain and strengthen our existing, fruitful relationships with ASEAN.

Second, we should urge our ASEAN friends to abandon the concept of a quadripartite arrangement, allowing a role for the Khmer Rouge in either the transition or an eventual coalition.

Third, we should try once again to persuade Sihanouk to break his ties to the Khmer Rouge, and this can only be done with genuine Thai cooperation and support.

Fourth, we should not permit American policy to be held hostage to China's regional interest. Our national interests in Indochina are not identical to China's, and our bilateral relations with Beij-

ing should not be conducted on the premise of China's presumed regional primacy.

Fifth, we should enter a serious dialog with Vietnam at a suitably high level on a broad range of issues extending beyond the current humanitarian menu of POW/MIA's, ODP, Amerasians, and reencamp inmates.

We should try to hammer out an understanding on a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia as part of a United States/Vietnam normalization package. This would include explicit guarantees from Vietnam as to a genuinely neutral, nonaligned, independent Cambodia, in which Cambodians of various political persuasions, can coexist.

Vietnam would receive the fruits of normalization, including a lifting of the trade and economic embargo.

It would also be advised that the United States understands clearly the difference between Vietnam's legitimate security concerns and its "hegemonistic" designs, as they are called.

We should also undertake contacts directly with Phnom Penh to explore conditions for a participation in a future coalition by those Cambodians who are not members of the KRP.

The strength of a non-Communist Cambodian position in a future Cambodia, lies in their economic clout, technical expertise, and connections with the international financial community, all of which can give influence and protection in a coalition with those now in power in Phnom Penh.

The administration should work with the Cambodian/American community to promote their unity and formal organization and preparation for participation in a new government.

On the longer term, for strategic, economic and psychological reasons, our objective should be to build a new bilateral relationship with Vietnam.

The timing of formal diplomatic relations, and the lifting of the embargo will depend on the unfolding of events in Cambodia over the next months.

Recognition should come only——

Senator CRANSTON. Forgive me for interrupting, but are you getting near the end, because the red light's on now.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. I will drop it right there, then.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK Z. BROWN

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the committee on U.S. relations with Indochina, an issue which has all but disappeared from view in recent years.

In foreign affairs, the crises of the moment preempt development of long-term policy. Indochina for most Americans is not a crisis but a humiliation better forgotten. Except for the early Carter years, three U.S. administrations since 1975 have assigned Indochina low priority. Only over the past year have prospects for a settlement in Cambodia and the gruesome resurgence of the Khmer Rouge excited interest in Washington. In both our political parties, a general apprehension lingers over "reinvolvement," however slight, in the affairs of Indochina. The wounds are still fresh and the domestic political risk still evident.

Most Americans have been ambivalent about Indochina, caught between curiosity about what went wrong and a counterimpulse to block out the whole tragedy. Absorbed by the war's drama and corrosive social impact, they have preferred to view the war through cinema prisms or novels about American soldiers in "Nam," where most of these works are set. Vietnam has become a fictional country where Vietnamese rarely appear except as targets.

Although Indochina still ranks far down in the Bush administration's foreign policy priorities, this blocking-out on the part of the American public appears to be giving way to a desire to understand the reasons for the Indochina war and to look at prospects for the future. This changing attitude is reflected in the Congress.

United States Interests in Indochina.—The theme of my testimony is that a preoccupation with the trauma of an involvement a generation ago should not obscure today's realities or preclude thoughtful consideration of a new relationship with the three countries of Indochina, where life goes on. Saigon didn't "fall," it was renamed Ho Chi Minh City—and 4 million Vietnamese who live there still call it Saigon.

Why should we care much about what happens in Indochina, that sad part of the world which used to be so important to us but which now seems irrelevant? There are at least four general reasons:

—Indochina does not exist in isolation but alongside some of our best friends in Southeast Asia, not to mention China. Our relationships with ASEAN loom far larger than any we are likely to develop with the Indochina states in the next generation. But there does not have to be an "either-or" choice. Continued close ties with our current friends elsewhere in Southeast Asia are not incompatible with a new relationship with Indochina. Indeed, they should be complementary.

—Vietnam, with its 65 million people, counts now; by the year 2000 it will weigh heavily in regional affairs. As leadership changes already underway demonstrate, the current Vietnamese leaders are neither immortal nor totally blind to their failures. We should position ourselves now to influence not only currently evolving policies but also a rising generation of Vietnamese who may come to see the world somewhat differently from their fathers.

—Of most immediate concern, the United States has both a political interest and a moral obligation to help create an equitable settlement in Cambodia.

—The Soviet Union has become a significant factor in Southeast Asia through it alliance with Vietnam (including military facilities) and a more imaginative foreign policy toward ASEAN and the Pacific nations. China remains an important regional player. While the Cold War may be abating (or just changing venue and style), there is clearly a need for an active American presence in the region—including Indochina. For purely geostrategic reasons, we should not by default cede to the Soviet Union and China the preponderant influence in shaping future events in Indochina.

Specific recommendations are in the concluding section of this testimony.

The Cambodia Problem.—Why is the United States in such a painful policy dilemma in the wake of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia? I believe there are three reasons:

—an unrealistic view of the non-Communist Cambodian resistance (NCR);

—a flawed appraisal of the situation on the ground in Cambodia;

—and a misjudgment of the Khmer Rouge as a threat to Cambodian society.

This confusion was illustrated last week when Vice President Quayle stated in Kuala Lumpur that the NCR needs weapons from the United States to protect itself against the Khmer Rouge. Almost simultaneously in New York the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations declared that there is less to be feared from the Khmer Rouge today than in 1975–78 and that "they obviously represent a significant number of Cambodians and can't be lightly dismissed."

Historical Background to the Present Dilemma.—The Bush administration inherited a Cambodia policy that was cautious, passive, and reliant upon ASEAN and China. Several years after the 1978 Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, the United States began providing financial support to the NCR. We permitted Thailand and others to carry out the actual organization, sustenance, and strengthening of the resistance forces. We had neither the desire nor the ability to shape the military or political efficacy of the NCR.

There were good, coherent reasons for "letting ASEAN take the lead." These were: an extraordinary sensitivity to the danger of "another Vietnam," a recognition of our diminished power in the region; the conviction that ASEAN should carry the ball; and the visceral reluctance on the part of our politicians and the Washington bureaucracy to jump back into Indochina.

Moreover, in deference to our budding bilateral relationship, we were not inclined to mess about in an affair of particular interest to China. And we were informed by some officials, Carter administration officials, that Cambodia was just a "proxy war" between Communist giants.

Nonetheless, our status as a superpower, our firm support for ASEAN, and our funding for the NCR made the United States a player in the Cambodia affair. In the end, we got the worst of both worlds: slightly committed to an involvement without

being able to shape its dimensions or eventual outcome except by becoming more deeply committed.

In 1982, ASEAN's intent in sponsoring Coalition Government of Kampuchea (CGDK) was to create pressure on Vietnam and force it to abandon its doctrine of "irreversibility" in Cambodia. China, with United States approval, poured resources into the Khmer Rouge. The idea was not to defeat Vietnam militarily but to use the CGDK's presence and pressure to drive Hanoi to the negotiating table. ASEAN's objective was not to install "democracy" or pluralism in Cambodia but to punish Vietnam's aggression. Guerrilla warfare was only one of several pressures. The American economic and trade embargo played a crucial role in this effort.

The non-Communists under Sihanouk and Son Sann, it was hoped, would become "strong enough to hold their own"—whatever that meant. Whether they would ever be able to dominate the CGDK and take the political lead in a future government in Phnom Penh was left vague. The Khmer Rouge were to be the cutting edge. As their strength grew, the nagging worry about how to get rid of Pol Pot sometime in the future occasionally surfaced.

Unfortunately, neither ASEAN nor the United States did what was necessary to make the NCR genuine contenders militarily or politically. Worse, in 1987, when the Cambodia stalemate showed signs of breaking, the United States was reluctant to take a strong position on effective measures to curb the Khmer Rouge. More interested in strengthening the strategic relationship with the Middle Kingdom, Washington did not make the future of Cambodia and the fate of the Khmer Rouge high priority issues in the bilateral dialog with Beijing.

In 1985, Representative Stephen Solarz' modest program for training the NCR in the Thai refugee camps caused consternation in the Reagan administration. Not only did this imply "another Vietnam," it raised the fundamental question of "where do we want to go from here?" No one wanted to seek the answer. Money was provided overtly but the tough political questions—the organization, leadership, motivation, and most crucial, the objectives of the non-Communist resistance—were not addressed by the administration.

At the same time, the NCR's leaders were bitterly divided among themselves, unsure of their purpose, and woefully deficient in all the professional skills of insurgency. In many cases they were far more interested in lining their pockets than in fighting the Vietnamese or organizing political cadres.

Meanwhile the Khmer Rouge, with lavish Chinese support and Thai protection, rebuilt their shattered military capability into a formidable strike force, using Sihanouk, Son Sann, and the CGDK as a cloak of international respectability.

And let us not forget that the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) under Hun Sen, starting from zero, began its own growth process. The PRK engaged in "nation building" with ample Vietnamese, Soviet, and socialist bloc aid and advice. Whether we like it or not, the PRK, through pragmatic, market-oriented policies, brought a modicum of stability and economic revival to many areas of Cambodia.

In sum, compared with its two rivals, the NCR has never evolved into a viable political alternative in a future Phnom Penh government to be achieved through political negotiations. American administrations since 1979 have either not understood this unfortunate fact or have chosen to ignore it in honor of our recessive posture in the region.

Neither American political interests nor the interests of non-Communist Cambodians have been well served by our ignorance and failure to grapple with the dynamics of insurgency over the past decade.

Blunt Questions About the Non-Communist Resistance.—In 1989, all these geopolitical chickens have come home to roost. U.S. policy finds itself espousing public support for an entity which has little capability to defend itself militarily or politically in a rough and tumble fight on new terrain. The United States is thus faced with the unpalatable prospect of throwing greater material and political support to Prince Sihanouk and the NCR in what appears, since Paris, to be an even closer alliance with the loathsome Khmer Rouge.

Is it too late for the NCR to mold itself into a viable alternative to the Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen regime? We need to pose blunt questions about what the United States wants in Cambodia, and what realistically we can expect to achieve.

First, we talk of the NCR as a third alternative to the Khmer Rouge and the PRK, as if the NCR were some powerful, unified force-in-being. But just who are the non-Communist resistance and whom in Cambodia do they represent? What is their program beyond getting the Vietnamese out of Cambodia?

Sihanouk is the figure around whom Khmer nationalism might coalesce to build a new society, but beyond his son Ranariddh and Son Sann, and a handful of others, who are the NCR cadres who could effectively share power with Hun Sen's team

and compete in the politico-military infighting with the Khmer Rouge? What political apparatus and administrative structure do Sihanouk and the NCR have to put into place in Cambodia either in a coalition (be it transition or otherwise) with Hun Sen's forces or as a substitute for the PRK should there be "victory" for the NCR? What are the lines of authority, and how is party discipline enforced?

It may make sense as a negotiating ploy to enter the KPNLF's name in the race for one-quarter of the stakes—but it is absurd to base a policy upon the assumption that the KPNLF is capable of exercising one-fourth of the political power in a future "quadripartite" coalition. Whom are we kidding? Certainly not the Communists in either camp.

Second, must the entire non-Communist cause depend on Sihanouk? Without demeaning the Prince's standing in the current negotiations, if we rely so heavily on Sihanouk, should we not ask what happens to the NCR if and when he departs the scene? There are already obvious divisions within his entourage. Should U.S. policy rest uniquely on a single—admittedly gifted and charismatic—leader? We are deluding ourselves dangerously if we look upon Sihanouk as a Charles de Gaulle under the present circumstances.

Third, we talk of a "time of testing" during the coming dry season. What military strategy will the NCR pursue in the coming months? Is it to capture and perhaps hold for a while Pailin, Sisaphong, Battambang, even Siem Riep? How can an effective military strategy be pursued either to overthrow the PRK or to drive it and Vietnam back to the negotiating table without close coordination with the Khmer Rouge? How could American "nonlethal" and "lethal" aid be separated in such an effort, even were we to attempt to do so? How many Cambodians do we expect to die in the process?

Is this a policy that the administration can endorse and then support on Capitol Hill and defend with the American public?

Fourth, who are the Cambodians we should be helping? Although the U.S. policy focus is heavily on the non-Communist resistance, what we should really worry about is the Cambodian people. It is argued that Vietnam and Hun Sen, by their intransigence on powersharing, are forcing 7 million Cambodians into a civil war promising nothing but further suffering. This is part of the truth. We should also recognize that if the choice is either civil war or the return of the Khmer Rouge, the great majority of these 7 million would choose to fight for what they have—little as it may be—under the PRK rather than be subjects of Pol Pot once again. Who are the Cambodians we should be concerned with?

—There are the millions of unknown Cambodians who never left Cambodia, who suffered under Pol Pot, who experienced the Vietnamese occupation, and who have for better or worse become part of the PRK's society. The economic revival under the PRK in the past few years has strengthened Hun Sen's hand. His greatest asset, however, is the universal fear of the Khmer Rouge, and this is magnified by the popular perception of Sihanouk working in league with the Khmer Rouge. Although in 1979 Hun Sen rode into Phnom Penh on Vietnamese tanks, in 1989, he is presiding over the withdrawal of the Vietnamese Army. This fact has redounded to his political benefit, as does the regime's steady campaign to highlight Khmer ethnicity and nationalism—with clear anti-Vietnamese overtones.

—Many Cambodians who remained in their country, or returned soon after 1979, have made the "morally ambiguous" choice of siding with Hun Sen and even joined the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP). No doubt they did so with deep uncertainty, even fear. Some served in the pre-1975 governments the United States supported and now serve in the present regime. They are putting their lives on the line because they cannot abide the thought of a return to power of the Khmer Rouge and because they see the current regime, with all its defects, as the best defense against such an event.

—325,000 Cambodians now languish in camps in Thailand. They want to return to their homes in conditions of security, and their political allegiance will go to whatever political entity can protect them. They should have that chance.

—Finally, other Cambodians who left Cambodia before 1975 have come back to visit but not stay. Without embracing Hun Sen's regime unequivocally, they have indicated a willingness to work with it in order to resist the Khmer Rouge and to reconstruct the country. They too should have an opportunity to return home.

Options for United States-Indochina Policy.—United States policy regarding Cambodia is inextricably linked with issues elsewhere in Indochina, most obviously normalization of relations with Vietnam. Following are proposed guidelines for fresh policies and attitudes toward the region:

First, we should raise the geopolitical priority assigned Indochina in our foreign policy councils and stop viewing the subregion as a diseased appendage to Southeast

Asia with small significance to U.S. interests in Asia and the Pacific. At the same time, we should maintain and strengthen our existing fruitful relationships with ASEAN.

Second, we should abandon the concept of a quadripartite arrangement allowing a significant role for the Khmer Rouge in either the transitional or eventual coalition government. It is folly to operate on the assumption that the Khmer Rouge will play by the rules. While continuing to build up their military forces, the Khmer Rouge have also developed diplomatic, political, and public relations skills which add a dangerous new dimension to their coercive threat. The Khmer Rouge's strategy remains the same: To use whatever means are necessary, including the image of moderation, to destroy their opponents. The Paris conference has shown beyond doubt that the Khmer Rouge are more dangerous inside the tent than outside—they will enter the tent only under conditions that favor their ultimate dominance.

Third, we should try once again to persuade Sihanouk to abandon his ties to the Khmer Rouge. Obviously, this can only be done with genuine Thai cooperation and support. The thrust of our effort should be to work closely with Thailand and ASEAN to construct a secure platform from which non-Communist Cambodians can participate in a future coalition government in Phnom Penh without the Khmer Rouge.

Fourth, we should break the image of American policy held hostage to China's regional interests, which include not only support for the Khmer Rouge but indefinite hostility to Vietnam. Our national interests in Indochina are not identical to China's. Consequently, our bilateral relations with Beijing should not be conducted on the premise that we must defer to China's presumed regional primacy. We should work with the international community to press China to cease its support for the Khmer Rouge.

Fifth, we should enter into a serious dialog with Vietnam at a suitably high level on a broad range of issues extending beyond the current humanitarian menu. After consultation with ASEAN, we would seek to hammer out an understanding on a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia as part of a United States-Vietnam normalization package. This would include explicit guarantees from Vietnam as to a genuinely neutral, nonaligned, independent Cambodia in which Cambodians of various political persuasions can coexist. In return, Vietnam would receive the fruits of normalization, including a lifting of the trade and economic embargo. It would also be advised that the United States understands clearly the difference between Vietnam's legitimate security concerns and any "hegemonistic" designs. While all this would be spelled out in a future international conference, a bilateral agreement in principle between Washington and Hanoi is an essential element of the multilateral process.

Sixth, we should undertake similar conversations directly with Phnom Penh to explore conditions for peaceful participation in a future coalition by those Cambodians who are not members of the KPRP. These would include not only the NCR but also refugee camp residents, expatriates, and any of the 7 million persons now under PRK control. Again, our dialog with Hun Sen should be in consonance with similar moves by Thailand and ASEAN.

Seventh, we should stop telling ourselves that the PRK is a Vietnamese puppet and recognize that the forces of Cambodian nationalism and fundamental distaste for Vietnam are, on the long term, more important and enduring that the PRK's half-baked communism. The sooner we, ASEAN, and the West have a presence in Phnom Penh (and the countryside), the greater will be the chance to promote economic revival and independence from Vietnam. Similarly, it would be wise to think through the significance of the charge that a number of the top PRK leaders are former Khmer Rouge. These leaders fled the Khmer Rouge 11 or 12 years ago. Should we presume that they represent the same threat as the loyal lieutenants of Pol Pot who remain faithful to him to this very day?

Eighth, Sihanouk's charisma may be helpful, but we should recognize that the strength of non-Communist Cambodians in a future Cambodian society lies in their economic clout, technical expertise, and connections with the international financial community, all of which could give them power and protection in a coalition with PRK adherents. The administration should work with the Cambodian-American community to promote their unity and formal organization in preparation for participation in a new government, and to enhance their appeal to their countrymen now living under the PRK. We should spell out to the PRK specific ways the United States could contribute to the rebuilding of Cambodia through both official and private voluntary agency assistance as well as private business investment.

Ninth, on the longer term, for strategic, economic, and psychological reasons, we should seek to build a new bilateral relationship with Vietnam. "Normalization" is

not some magical act achieved by the stroke of a pen. Since the United States has never had normal relations with Vietnam or the Vietnamese, either North or South, we should not expect such a relationship to come easily. Normalization is a process, not a fixed goal, and the process will take a lot of hard work on both sides. The actual timing of formal diplomatic relations and lifting of the embargo will depend on the unfolding of events in Cambodia over the next months. Clearly, Vietnam is the demandeur. But it is in our interest as well to have a presence in Hanoi as soon as possible to understand the evolution of Vietnam's system, to promote resolution of humanitarian problems, and to get on with the business of relating to the Vietnamese people in a constructive fashion. There is immense potential for people-to-people contact of benefit to both countries.

Tenth, although Vietnam will retain its Marxist-Leninist character for some time, it should be viewed as an integral part of Southeast Asia, as a country with hopes and fears rooted in a long history and a unique culture. The same can be said for Cambodia and Laos. In all three countries, given their history and diversity, we might hope for the emergence of some form of national independence away from China and/or the Soviet Union, and interdependence with ASEAN. This trend is already underway between Thailand and Laos, and will accelerate rapidly elsewhere if and when there is peace in Cambodia. The American perspective on Indochina should be set in this historical framework, plotted in generations not fiscal years. The thrust of our strategy in the next decade should be to show Vietnam that its national interests are served less by Marxism and loyalty to a Communist bloc than by peaceful membership in the East Asian community and good relations with the West.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. I did want to have time to ask you questions.

Mr. CHILDRESS.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD CHILDRESS, PRESIDENT, ASIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. CHILDRESS. Thank you. I have remarks I have provided for the record.

Senator CRANSTON. Yes. It will appear.

Mr. CHILDRESS. I will try to summarize, as quickly as possible, a very complex problem, and in fact, my introduction talked about the complexities of the problem and how most commentators that I am hearing today on Cambodia are ignoring a lot of the historic animosities, ignoring the ethnic and ideological splits that go back and form the basis for a lot of the phenomena we are seeing today.

Vietnamese/Cambodian, Vietnamese/Chinese animosity is historic and deep rooted, and the marriage of convenience, for instance, between the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge that hastened the downfall of the Lon Nol government, was a temporary phenomenon, as has been other alliances in Southeast Asia.

We sometimes forget Vietnamese supported the Khmer Rouge in those earlier days and that the split between the Vietnamese and Chinese factions was a reflection of both ethnic tensions as well as the ideological schism between Beijing and Moscow.

For too many years both Hanoi and Beijing have been prepared to fight to the last Cambodian. In such a situation, it is incumbent upon the United States to support a comprehensive solution that would prevent either of these totalitarian currents to prevail.

The truth is that neither Hun Sen's installed government in Phnom Penh nor the Khmer Rouge offer us real encouragement concerning support for a comprehensive settlement.

Seeking a stable course between such powerful Cambodian currents, with outside support, is also not new.

Prince Sihanouk, facing Communist rebellion of his rule in the late 1960's, warned both Beijing and Hanoi against interference in Cambodia's internal affairs, and massive demonstrations occurred in Phnom Penh against the Vietnamese.

About this time, one of his senior leftist deputies in the National Assembly, disappeared to join the Khmer Rouge struggle, only to reappear after the Vietnamese invasion. His name, of course, is Khieu Sampan.

In another marriage of convenience to attempt a balance between overwhelming pressures, Prince Sihanouk embraced Beijing's announcement that he was head of state, and Khieu Samp became deputy prime minister and minister of national defense, fighting together to oust Lon Nol.

In support of the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam filled their combat ranks with up to 70 percent ethnic Vietnamese, and Ieng Sary was a special representative of the Cambodian resistance in the interior.

After the Khmer Rouge takeover in Cambodia, the traditional animosities and the ideological schisms in the Communist camp, reasserted themselves, leading to KR attacks on the Vietnamese border, the eventual Vietnamese invasion and the installation of Khieu Samp and his comrades, including Hun Sen.

It is important to note that the struggle today among the Cambodian factions is a continuation of these earlier struggles, and the non-Communist elements in this struggle are still attempting to balance these powerful forces.

Prince Sihanouk's current marriage of convenience in a coalition with the Beijing-backed wing of Cambodian communism, must be seen in this light.

My conversations with the non-Communist leadership give me confidence that they are as determined as we not to allow the Khmer Rouge to control Cambodia again.

Despite characterizations that the Prince follows an erratic, unpredictable course, a clear consistency in the Prince's behavior is present. When pressured too hard by Beijing or the Khmer Rouge, he has resigned. When pressured too hard to acquiesce to Vietnamese or Hun Sen's demands, he has moved closer to the PRC.

The Prince is constantly attempting to position himself, to stay central to a solution and not be, once again, in an embrace that could be his last this time.

His ability to resist pressure to compromise on Cambodian self-determination will only increase in proportion to his strength, which means backing by the United States in the international community.

In this regard, I believe the administration's strong endorsement of the NCR and Prince Sihanouk's leadership is exactly right.

For many years, Cambodian policy was relatively simple; we had a foreign occupation by Vietnam. Our task was to back regional calls for withdrawal. That has now changed.

Vietnam, faced with a disastrous economic situation, inability to defeat the resistance in Cambodia and international isolation, is now removing regular PAVN forces.

Despite repeated calls, however, to allow effective U.N. supervision of this withdrawal, they have refused and now attempt to put

the onus of the Khmer Rouge throughout on those who pressured them to withdraw.

That is Orwellian the extreme, but as it generated ill-considered cause in the West to focus solely on the KR threat, and accept Hun Sen's government as permanent and somehow benign. Such a course is a guarantee of continued civil war in Cambodia, in my opinion.

It also defies logic to me to believe that the Vietnamese would totally abandon the battlefield to their enemy and place themselves in the same situation they faced in the late 1970's, when Pol Pot sat where Hun Sen sits today. If Vietnam could not defeat the Khmer Rouge, they cannot believe Hun Sen is capable of doing so alone.

For a decade, the ASEAN-led strategy has, in fact, been successful. They are withdrawing, and now we have a greater challenge. It was the fear of such a scenario we face today, after witnessing an Afghanistan, which prompted the Reagan Administration to posit a conditional normalization with Hanoi that called not only for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces but their cooperation in reaching a comprehensive settlement.

Vietnam is yet to accept that clear responsibility.

Mr. Chairman, in my remarks, I also discuss in detail what I think the quadripartite interim arrangement could mean if done carefully to, in fact, trap the Khmer Rouge, and bring greater international pressure on China in the end.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Childress follows:]

STATEMENT OF RICHARD T. CHILDRESS

Mr. Chairman, Senator Murkowski, I would like to thank you and the committee for inviting my testimony today and commend you for holding these timely hearings.

In one form or another, I have wrestled with the tragedy of Cambodia for the past 12 years. I vividly recall, when I lived in Thailand in 1977–78, seeing the victims of Pol Pot's butchery in camps along the border and providing journalists and others with evidence from these people to awaken the world to the ongoing tragedy. I also recall arguing with American defenders of the Khmer Rouge takeover during the same period and earlier. Ironically, many that naively blinded themselves to the ongoing brutalities then are now condemning the U.S. Government for policies which they claim support the return of Pol Pot. In the wake of Hanoi's assumed withdrawal, their current attacks appear at times to be more primal scream therapy than attempts at serious dialog.

This emotional legacy from our involvement in the Vietnam war has been exacerbated by a spate of commentary in the press and on television which grossly simplifies a complex regional and international problem. Many of these pundits could hardly spell Cambodia 2 to 3 years ago and have done an enormous disservice to the public debate.

If the United States is to play a responsible and far-sighted role in assuring self-determination and peace for the Cambodian people, such irrationality has to subside. It is disturbing to hear fellow American accuse policymakers who are working to help fashion and international solution of contributing to future genocide. I have yet to meet an American since the late 1970's who is a defender of Pol Pot.

It is also unfortunate that much of the commentary on Cambodia ignores the historic animosities, both ethnic and ideological, that sometimes outweigh what appear to be the salient questions of the moment.

Vietnamese-Cambodian and Vietnamese-Chinese animosity is historic and deep-rooted. The marriage of convenience between the Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge that hastened the downfall of the Lon Nol government was a temporary phenomena, as have been other alliance in Southeast Asia. We sometimes forget Vietnamese support of the Khmer Rouge in those earlier days and that the split between the

Vietnamese and Chinese factions was a reflection of ethnic tensions as well as the ideological schism between Beijing and Moscow. For too many years, both Hanoi and Beijing have been prepared to fight to the last Cambodian.

In such a situation, it is incumbent upon the United States to support a comprehensive solution that will prevent either of these totalitarian currents to prevail. The truth is that neither Hun Sen's installed government in Phnom Penh nor the Khmer Rouge offer us real encouragement concerning support for a comprehensive settlement.

Seeking a stable course between such powerful Cambodian currents with outside support is also not new. Prince Sihanouk, facing Communist rebellion against his rule in the last 1960's, warned both Beijing and Hanoi against interference in Cambodia's internal affairs, and massive demonstrations occurred in Phnom Penh against the Vietnamese. About this time, one of the senior leftist deputies in the national assembly disappeared to join the Khmer Rouge struggle, only to reappear after the Vietnamese invasion. His name, of course, is Khieu Sampan.

In another marriage of convenience to attempt a balance between overwhelming pressures, Prince Sihanouk embraced Beijing's announcement that he was head of state, and Khieu Sampan became Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, fighting together to oust Lon Nol. In support of the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam filled their combat ranks with up to 70 percent ethnic Vietnamese, and Ieng Sary was a special representative of the Cambodian resistance in the interior.

After the Khmer Rouge takeover in Cambodia, the traditional animosities and the ideological schisms in the Communist camp reasserted themselves, leading to KR attacks on the Vietnamese border, and eventual Vietnamese invasion and the installation of Khieu Sampan and his comrades, including Hun Sen.

This brief rundown of history is given to help put into better perspective the current situation rapidly evolving rapidly due to the withdrawal of regular Vietnamese forces. It is important to note that the struggle today among the Cambodian factions is a continuation of these earlier struggles, and the non-Communist elements in this struggle are still attempting to balance these powerful forces.

Prince Sihanouk's current marriage of convenience in a coalition with the Beijing-backed wing of Cambodian Communism must be seen in this light. My conversations with the non-Communist leadership gives me confidence that they are as determined as we not to allow the Khmer Rouge to control Cambodia again. Despite characterizations that he only follows an erratic, unpredictable course, a clear consistency in the Prince's behavior is present. When pressured too hard by Beijing or the Khmer Rouge, he has resigned. When pressured too hard to acquiesce to Vietnamese or Hun Sen's demands, he has moved closer to the PRC. The Prince is constantly attempting to position himself to stay central to a solution and not be once again in an embrace that could be his last.

His ability to resist pressures to compromise on Cambodian self-determination will only increase in proportion to his strength, which means backing by the United States and the international community. In this regard, I believe the administration's strong endorsement of Prince Sihanouk now is exactly right.

For many years, Cambodian policy was relatively simple. A foreign army occupied its neighbor by military means and installed an occupation government, and our task was to back regional calls for a withdrawal. Vietnam, faced with a disastrous economic situation at home, inability to defeat the resistance in Cambodia and international isolation, is now removing regular PAVN forces. However, despite repeated calls to allow effective United Nations monitoring of the withdrawal, they have refused and now attempt to put the onus of the Khmer Rouge threat on those who pressured them to withdraw.

That is Orwellian in the extreme, but it has generated ill-considered calls in the west to focus solely on the KR threat and accept Hun Sen's government as permanent and somehow benign. Such a course is a guarantee of continued civil war in Cambodia, and moves further from an internationally sanctioned and supervised settlement.

That is Orwellian in the extreme, but it has generated ill-considered calls in the West to focus solely on the KR threat and accept Hun Sen's government as permanent and somehow benign. Such a course is a guarantee of continued civil war in Cambodia, and moves us further from an internationally sanctioned and supervised settlement.

In my opinion, it defies logic to believe that the Vietnamese will totally abandon the battlefield to their enemy and place themselves in the same situation they faced in the late 1970's when Pol Pot sat where Hun Sen sits today. If Vietnam could not defeat the Khmer Rouge, they can't believe Hun Sen is capable of doing so alone.

Vietnam has clear security interests in Cambodia, as does Thailand. Any settlement that is to be permanent must take this into account, and it must be a settlement which provides for Cambodian self-determination and no return of the Khmer Rouge to power.

For a decade, the ASEAN-led strategy has, in fact, been successful. Vietnam is withdrawing, but the specter of a withdrawal without a political settlement poses a new challenge. It is the fear of such a scenario, after witnessing it in Afghanistan, which prompted the Reagan administration to posit a conditional normalization with Hanoi that called for not only the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, but their cooperation in reaching a comprehensive settlement.

Vietnam has yet to accept this clear responsibility. More worrisome still are the recent speeches in August and September by Nguyen Van Linh, reacting to the events in Tienanmen Square and Eastern Europe clearly signal old conservative pressures on those who might be inclined to cooperate seriously. U.S. policy must take these internal events in Hanoi into account.

It is not difficult to discern which forces should be supported, the challenge is in how to do so. Too frequently, commentators appear to believe that acquiescence to Vietnamese demands reinforces moderates. In fact, such behavior usually has the opposite effect.

Having led or participated in every U.S. policy level delegation to Hanoi from 1982 until I left the White House in April 1989, I can assure the committee that there was no mistake in the minds of those with whom we dealt that we were prepared to work with them to fashion a comprehensive Cambodia settlement, taking into account their legitimate security concerns, which in turn could lead them out of their isolation. It is equally clear, they themselves have been unable to agree on following this rational course of action.

Recognizing that U.S. leverage is not as great as we would wish or that many assert, how then can we employ a combination of positive and negative incentives to move us closer to a solution, one that provides for self-determination, prevents the return of the Khmer Rouge to power and provides disincentives for Hanoi to seek a fait accompli solution in support of the government they installed?

On the positive side, I believe it to be critically important that Hanoi receive the message often, both publicly and privately, that the United States does look forward to normalization and will seriously work to that end in the context of a settlement in Cambodia. This has been said before, but some in Hanoi still do not believe it, and gratuitous "Hanoi bashing" does not help. The legacy of Vietnam cannot be allowed to distract us from the current challenge, even while we must continue to pursue with highest priority the resolution of the POW/MIA issue.

Vietnam knows the criticality of this issue to Americans, and they can do much more than they are now doing. We must continue to emphasize to them that resolving the POW/MIA issue honestly will preposition them for the future. I agree with the nonlinkage policy followed by this administration, but the POW/MIA issue could become a political obstacle if Hanoi does not decide to be more forthcoming in our joint efforts by providing us answers they clearly possess.

We should seek opportunities to commend Vietnam where it is deserved. Positive reinforcement of genuine attempts by Vietnam to cooperate should not draw only cynicism, despite Hanoi's ability to reverse themselves regularly to their own detriment.

A clear signal of our interest could be sent via Laos as well. Laos has responded to our calls for cooperation on POW/MIA, narcotics, and other matters in a far more cooperative way than Hanoi. We have had unbroken diplomatic relations since 1950, and an upgrade in our relations to Ambassador is now overdue. It should be done on its own merits, but it also could serve to demonstrate to Hanoi that we will keep our word when they respond.

In the Cambodian context, we need to continue to make clear our resolute interest in helping to prevent a return of Pol Pot to power. Much criticism has been levied on Prince Sihanouk for advocating the participation of elements of the Khmer Rouge into an interim body under international auspices, leading to elections. By dismissing such a possibility, we ensure that the Khmer Rouge have only one option—continuing the armed struggle. Fashioning a peaceful option for participation of Khmer Rouge elements, less their leadership, and securing PRC agreement and international supervision, is one means of testing the sincerity of both the PRC and the Khmer Rouge.

If such agreement were reached, and the Khmer Rouge decided to be a spoiler, the pressures on the PRC to abandon them would be immense. This would be much more effective than asking them to abandon the Khmer Rouge absent a settlement.

Such an agreement could also create internal Khmer Rouge tensions and provide the opportunity for civilians under their control to return home.

Should the core decide to fight on under such conditions, they would do so from a weakened position, isolated in the Cardamon Mountains with a sealed Thai border and a sponsor in Beijing which would need to decide whether continued support in the face of a united international stance was in their national interest. It is important that the United States and the international community attempt to convince Hanoi and Phnom Penh that we are sincerely ready to work with them on such measures.

Should the Khmer Rouge disconnect from such an agreement, then it is quite conceivable that Prince Sihanouk and the non-Communists would join with Hun Sen to collectively contain the Khmer Rouge, and they would have international support to do so. Attempts to broker such an alliance without providing a structure for the Khmer Rouge to disarm and participate, and without international verification of Vietnamese withdrawal, is not a realistic option.

We should also make clear to Hanoi and Phnom Penh that the United States will support significant reconstruction aid to Cambodia should they cooperate in such a settlement. A neutral and independent Cambodia, led by those chosen by the people under international guarantees, is not a threat to Hanoi. They need to be encouraged in this direction.

The negative incentives are in place and well known. International isolation, the U.S. trade embargo and the withholding of diplomatic representation have their place. Given the apparent decision in Hanoi to withdraw unilaterally without cooperating in a settlement, it would, unfortunately, be premature to change our posture now. We should, however, continue to make it clear that we are prepared to respond in a cooperative way to their needs in the context of a genuine settlement.

I returned last week from Southeast Asia, my third trip to the region since April. In ASEAN, I still find a determination to reach a comprehensive settlement in Cambodia. Our policy has been based upon the premise that a regional settlement, backed by international guarantees, is the only settlement which can last. My recent conversations with many of the leaders of the ASEAN convinces me that they agree with this course as well and will depend on us to support them in this difficult task.

It seems to me that the principles we hold are well-understood. We seek only to ensure the right of the Cambodian people to choose their government free from outside interference. The non-Communist Cambodians share these principles, and we owe it to them and to ourselves not to waiver in our determination to help fashion a settlement based upon such principles.

Thank you.

Senator CRANSTON. I thank you for your testimony and I thank you for observing the red light.

Mr. Conboy?

STATEMENT OF KENNETH CONBOY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. CONBOY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me the opportunity to submit a longer report. I will just summarize this one.

Last week, Vietnam alleged to have withdrawn its last combat units from Cambodia. While all of us here hope that Vietnam has, indeed, departed Cambodia, unfortunately recent history has proven Hanoi to be less than sincere in fulfilling similar promises. Some examples include:

In 1962, following the Geneva agreement confirming Laos' neutrality, the United States withdraw its entire military assistance and advisory group. Vietnam, in contrast, and in flagrant violation of the Geneva agreement, maintained in Laos thousands of its soldiers and main force combat units.

Some four Vietnamese divisions were ultimately thrown against the Royal Lao Government. Dozens were taken prisoner, yet incredibly, Hanoi had the audacity during the war years to deny that they had a combat presence in Laos.

In 1973, a cease-fire went into effect in Laos and a coalition government was formed. Vietnam, again in violation of international agreements, kept combat elements throughout Laos.

In January 1973, with a cease-fire scheduled to go into effect in Vietnam and the possibility of another cease-fire in Cambodia, a Vietnamese prisoner stated that Hanoi planned to keep regimental size units inside Cambodia with its troops disguised as Khmer guerrillas.

I have cited other examples in my full report. What these examples serve to illustrate is the fact that Hanoi has always been less than forthcoming in its promises and commitments. At the very least, Hanoi's claim of a total withdrawal should be accepted with extreme caution. Anything short of this, and I am afraid we are likely to be burned once more.

Not only is there more than ample reason to question Vietnam's sincerity in immediately removing its overt military presence from Vietnam, there is also reason to doubt whether Hanoi intends to sever its significant nonmilitary links to Cambodia that it has built up during a decade of occupation.

For example, what of the unequal border treaties it signed with the PRK governments in the early 1980's, or of its elaborate system of "twinning" its provincial administrations with counterparts in the Hun Sen government, or the undetermined number of Vietnamese civilian "advisors" that Vietnam says will remain behind in Cambodia, or of the large presence of Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia, which ASEAN estimates to number of many as 450,000 persons?

Not only must Vietnam's future intentions in Cambodia be questioned, but I believe that the Hun Sen regime in Phnom Penh also deserves more critical scrutiny. A careful examination of that regime uncovers some shocking details.

For example: The Eastern Region Khmer Rouge forces from where much of the current Phnom Penh leadership originates, including Hun Sen and Heng Samrin, committed some of the most brutal attacks of the entire 1970–75 war. I cite several examples in my report, and once the Khmer Rouge took over, Hun Sen himself was identified as personally responsible for the most bloody cross-border massacre of Vietnamese civilians during the Pol Pot days.

Since it assumed power in 1979, the Hun Sen leadership has continued with systematic violations of human rights on a scale often associated with the current Khmer Rouge organization. These violations have been fully covered by Amnesty International and previously by Kassie Neou only a few minutes ago.

In short, the Hun Sen leadership has stained hands. Given this fact, it disturbs me to hear some suggesting that the crimes of that government should be forgotten or downplayed simply because they were not of the same degree as the current Khmer Rouge.

Both the Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen regime are repulsive, and U.S. policy should be more sophisticated than merely siding with the Hun Sen regime because it is allegedly the lesser of two evils. Certainly, the situation in Cambodia is not simply a choice between the Khmer Rouge and Hun Sen. The ASEAN-supported coalition arrangement, which would remain only until free and fair elections could be held, I believe represents the best alternative.

In backing ASEAN, the United States has supported the formation of such a coalition. I believe that this is the most promising choice in what is a rather complicated situation. I would also add that the NCR, both the KPNLF and the ANS, has shown surprising resilience in the last 6 months, showing marked improvement in both quality and quantity.

I would maintain that only Prince Sihanouk has the capability of uniting the country and his son, Ranariddh, also has a surprising amount of following. Moreover, midlevel commanders in both organizations to me have shown the ability to take over at the national level. In short, the NCR has definite potential that cannot be dismissed.

In the past, coalitions have failed, most notably in Laos on three occasions, but in these cases failure can be pinned to the lack of an objective, aggressive observer force. This shortcoming cannot be allowed to repeat itself in Cambodia. The observer force must be given complete access to the entire country, especially the border provinces, where Vietnamese supplies are likely to be transshipped.

Considering the larger question of United States-Vietnam relations, I do not think there is any reason why the United States should not normalize in time. However, I believe that a quick move in this direction would not be in U.S. interests. In fact, it is not certain if the Vietnamese have, in fact, completely left Cambodia, and as stated previously, Vietnam's track record of abiding by promises is very poor.

In short, I think that Vietnam has left behind a Cambodia on the verge of a civil war, a situation for which it is more than a little responsible. Therefore, I do not think that any consideration should be given to normalizing relations until Vietnam has shown its willingness to lay down a foundation for a stable Cambodia.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conboy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH CONBOY

Last week, Vietnam alleged to have withdrawn its last combat units from Cambodia. Within 24 hours—before a viable, objective, international observer force was in place to verify Hanoi's claim—some here in Washington began calling for acceptance of Vietnam's withdrawal claims, acceptance of the Hun Sen regime Vietnam left behind in Phnom Penh, and the normalization of United States relations with Vietnam.

While all of us here hope that Vietnam has, indeed, departed Cambodia, unfortunately, recent history has proven Hanoi to be less than sincere in fulfilling similar promises. Some examples include:

● In 1962, following the Geneva Agreement confirming Laos' neutral status, the United States abided by the agreement and withdrew its entire military assistance and advisory group; Vietnam, in contrast, publicly withdrew a few dozen "specialists" and "technicians." In flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement, thousands more Vietnamese soldiers remained behind in main force combat units, as advisers to the Pathet Lao, and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail logistical conduit.

Over the next 10 years, Vietnam maintained as many as four main line divisions fighting directly against Royal Lao Government forces, not to mention tens of thousands of Vietnamese soldiers stationed on and passing through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. These forces sustained tens of thousands of casualties, and dozens of Vietnamese taken prisoner by the Royal Lao Government were paraded before the international media. Despite overwhelming evidence (and later its own public admission), Hanoi had the audacity during the war years to deny it maintained any combat presence in Laos.

● In 1973, a cease-fire was signed in Laos and a coalition government was formed. Again, in violation of international agreements, Vietnam maintained main force combat elements throughout Laos, as well as advisers to the Pathet Lao, and its huge logistic corridor running down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

● In January 1973, with a cease-fire scheduled to go into effect in Vietnam and the possibility of another cease-fire in Cambodia, a Vietnamese prisoner captured in Cambodia stated that Hanoi planned to keep two regiments of its C–40 Division—with its troops disguised as Khmer—inside Cambodia in order to continue fighting the pro-Western Khmer Republic.

● Despite promises made in the Paris agreements, the North Vietnamese ultimately invaded the South in one of the largest conventional offensives since World War Two.

● In all of the first seven partial Vietnamese withdrawals from Cambodia, the overwhelming consensus in the West has been that much of this activity actually involved troop rotations rather than withdrawals.

These examples serve to illustrate the fact that Hanoi has always been less than forthcoming in its promises and commitments. In addition, the ease of moving undetected back and forth across the long porous border between Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as the present lack of an adequate impartial observer force, suggests, at the very least, that Hanoi's claim of a total withdrawal should be accepted with extreme caution. Indeed, over the past week there has been an outpouring of charges that Vietnamese combat support units—some of them disguised as Cambodians—have pulled back to the interior of the country, but are still very much inside Cambodia. Moreover, the Vietnamese have suggested recently that some civilian "specialists" might remain behind in Cambodia; the term "specialist," however, has long been a Vietnamese euphemism for specialized military personnel sent on missions outside its border.

Not only is there more than ample reason to question Vietnam's sincerity in immediately removing its overt military presence in Vietnam, there also is reason to doubt whether Hanoi intends to sever the significant nonmilitary links to Cambodia that it built up during a decade of occupation. For example, Vietnam signed a series of unequal border treaties in the early 1980's with the Hun Sen regime giving it control over contested sea- and air-lanes along the Cambodian border. Vietnam also has instituted a process of "twinning" its own provincial administrations with counterparts in the Hun Sen government; these twinning arrangements have given Vietnam a strong hold over Cambodia's trade and internal development policy. In addition, Hanoi admits that an undetermined number of civilian "advisors" will remain behind in Cambodia.

Of even greater concern are the Vietnamese settlers that remain in Cambodia, many of them in the best ricegrowing and fishing regions. The Hun Sen regime admits that 80,000 such Vietnamese will stay in Cambodia; however, estimates by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations put the figure as high as 450,000 Vietnamese. Given the traditional animosity between Vietnamese and Khmer, the presence of such a large number of Vietnamese may well spark a bloody backlash against the settlers; in 1970, such a pogrom resulted in the deaths of scores of Vietnamese and a mass exodus toward South Vietnam.

Not only must Vietnam's future intentions in Cambodia be questioned, but I believe the Hun Sen regime in Phnom Penh also deserves more critical scrutiny. Although a concerted public relations blitz from Hanoi and Phnom Penh has attempted to soften the image of the Hun Sen regime, a careful examination of that regime uncovers some shocking details. For example:

● Much research has been done on the origins of the Hun Sen-Heng Samrin leadership in Phnom Penh, tracing them back to those Khmer Rouge cadres that developed in the Eastern Region along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border from 1970–75. It has often been claimed that the Khmer Rouge's Eastern Region forces remained relatively isolated in their geographic area of operation, that they were less "brutal" than other factions of the Khmer Rouge, and that they did not mingle to a considerable extent with the more spartan elements of the Khmer Rouge.

These views, however, are very much in error. In fact, the Eastern Region forces often surpassed the brutality of other Khmer Rouge regions, and often sent their forces to fight as integrated units in other areas of Cambodia alongside what traditionally have been termed the more hardline Khmer Rouge elements.

A chilling example of Eastern Region atrocities occurred in the summer of 1973 at Kompong Cham, the third largest Cambodian city. In a concerted effort to take over the city, 16 Khmer Rouge battalions from the Eastern Region massed on Kompong Cham. Command of the operation was held by the Eastern Region leadership, which included such personalities as Hun Sen and Heng Samrin.

During the second week of September 1973, the Eastern Region forces pushed halfway across Kompong Cham. According to a Washington Post article written on September 10, the Khmer Rouge guerrillas threw handgrenades and plastic explosives into still-occupied houses. They subsequently overran two hospitals, into which they threw handgrenades and later slit the throats of critically ill patients.

The Eastern Region forces were ultimately pushed out of Kompong Cham, but the attack was remembered as the single most brutal Khmer Rouge operation of the entire 1970–75 war.

Immediately after the events at Kompong Cham, the Eastern Region forces were dispatched across Cambodia. According to monthly military situation reports prepared by the U.S. Defense Attache in Phnom Penh at the time, the Eastern Region dispatched task forces of up to two regiments to the Phnom Penh vicinity in December 1973, to heavy fighting in the upper Bassac region throughout 1974, and to Svay Rieng in September 1974.

In these battlefields, the Eastern Region participated in ferocious fighting alongside what was to have been traditionally termed the more hardline Khmer Rouge elements in the southern and northwestern regions. Thus, the Eastern Region forces were an integrated part of the fighting across the country, and, as such, should be seen as equally responsible for the brutality displayed during the final years of fighting against the pro-Western Khmer Republic Government.

It should also be noted that during 1973–74, thousands of refugees fled from areas held by the Eastern Region and flooded into cities like Kompong Cham in order to escape brutal treatment from the Khmer Rouge in that zone. This large number of refugees was approximately the same as those fleeing from areas controlled by what has traditionally been deemed more "hardline" Khmer Rouge regions.

● After the Khmer Rouge victory in April 1975, the Eastern Region was no less prone than other Khmer Rouge regions to acts of mindless brutality. For example, it has been charged that Hun Sen himself, as a senior military commander in the Eastern Region, personally led the single greatest cross-border massacre of Vietnamese civilians during the Pol Pot days. (Bangkok Post, Feb. 5, 1989.)

It was this Eastern Region leadership—composed of the same people directly responsible for the most bloody offensive before the fall of Phnom Penh in April 1975 and for the largest cross-border massacre of Vietnamese civilians—that the Vietnamese installed in Phnom Penh.

● Since it assumed power in 1979, the Hun Sen leadership has continued with systematic violations of human rights on a scale often associated with the current Khmer Rouge organization. These violations have been fully covered by Amnesty International, most recently in their March 1989 update. I might also mention that this summer—at the same time when so many Cambodian delegations from this country were being welcomed into Phnom Penh—Hun Sen refused to discuss the issue of political prisoners with a visiting representative from the U.S. Lawyers Committee on Human Rights.

● Finally, the Hun Sen regime shares another similarity with the current Khmer Rouge organization in that it has attempted to greatly expand its military forces in recent months by pressing into service scores of children. Many of these underage combatants are now on the frontline of the Pailin battlefield.

Given the fact that the Hun Sen leadership, too, has stained hands, and given the fact that Vietnam's promises need to be objectively verified, how should the United States craft its policy toward Cambodia?

The Bush administration's Cambodian policy, I believe, is focused in the right direction, though I think it should be faulted for not going far enough. Basically, the United States has followed the ASEAN lead of pushing for a Vietnamese withdrawal and the formation of a four-party coalition interim government. Certainly, this policy appears to have succeeded in helping force Vietnam to withdraw the vast bulk of its forces from Cambodia. The administration's early push for lethal assistance, I believe, should also be applauded for raising morale among the non-Communist Cambodian resistance and sending a strong signal of support to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Unfortunately, the administration's subsequent foot-dragging on the actual provision of lethal aid has only served to confuse the resistance and ASEAN at this critical crossroads.

At this juncture, with the United States, ASEAN, and the vast majority of the non-Communist world having come so far in expelling the Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, it is no time for Washington to throw up its arms and accept the Hun Sen regime in Phnom Penh as legitimate. As recounted above, the Hun Sen government is led by former Khmer Rouge cadre who, despite reports to the contrary, have proven themselves to be no less brutal than many of the Khmer Rouge names now heard most frequently in connection with genocide trials. In short, U.S. policy

should be more sophisticated than merely siding with the Hun Sen regime because it is allegedly the "lesser of two evils." Both the Hun Sen regime and the Khmer Rouge are repugnant.

Certainly, the situation in Cambodia is not simply a choice between the Khmer Rouge and the Hun Sen regime. The ASEAN-supported coalition arrangement—which would remain only until free and fair elections could be held—I believe represents the best alternative. Such a coalition will include the two Communist factions plus Prince Nodorom Sihanouk's non-Communist FUNCINPEC, and Son Sann's anti-Communist KPNLF. Diplomatically, these last two groups have widespread support in the West. Prince Sihanouk, in particular, is generally recognized as the only figure that has the international stature and grassroots support necessary to balance all four factions to the degree of bringing a semblance of peace to Cambodia. Sihanouk, I believe, has come under unfair criticism recently for being pro-Khmer Rouge. Nothing could be further from the truth. Above all, Sihanouk has been anti-Vietnamese; he has also been forced to be pro-Chinese, simply because the support he has received from the West has been less than reliable. While he correctly sees a temporary coalition with the Khmer Rouge as the only means of luring their 40,000 supporters from the forests and into the open, this does not translate into him being pro-Khmer Rouge.

Militarily, the two non-Communist factions are the smallest among the four Cambodian factions. However, they have shown encouraging improvement in recent months. Sihanouk's group, which has been steadily building since 1985, can now field perhaps as many as 20,000 guerrillas and support personnel. the KPNLF, which has displayed surprising resilience over the last 6 months, can assemble as many as 15,000 irregulars. Together, they represent a hope for Cambodia, a potential moderating influence over both the Hun Sen regime and Khmer Rouge should they be incorporated into a coalition government.

In the past, coalitions have failed, most notably the 1957, 1962, and 1973 experiments in Laos. In all three of these cases' failure can be pinned to the lack of an objective, aggressive observer force. For example, the observers in Laos spent little time in the field, and usually refrained from charging the Communist side with even the most blatant violations. This shortcoming cannot be allowed to repeat itself in the case of Cambodia. The observer force must be given access to the entire country of Cambodia, especially the border provinces where Vietnamese supplies are likely to be transshipped. More important, the force must include a sufficient number of Cambodian members to help identify any Vietnamese that have remained behind and could not otherwise be identified by non-Cambodians in the force.

Concerning the larger question of United States-Vietnam relations, I do not think there is any reason why the United States should not normalize relations in time. However, I believe that any quick moves in this direction would not by in U.S. interests. It is not yet certain if the Vietnamese have, in fact, completely left Cambodia, and, as stated previously, Vietnam's track record of abiding by promises is very poor. Moreover, Vietnam has left behind a Cambodia on the verge of civil war, a situation for which Hanoi is more than a little responsible. Therefore, I do not believe that any consideration should be given to normalized relations until Vietnam has shown its willingness to lay the foundation for a stable Cambodia. For example, Vietnam should stop the shipment of major weapons systems to Cambodia, such as jet aircraft, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. Moreover, if the civilian Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia prove to be as large as the ASEAN estimates, Vietnam also must be willing to accept their return. Last, an effective observer/peacekeeping force in Cambodia should first be deployed, a coalition formed, and the process for free and fair elections already started. Only then, with a comprehensive settlement in place, with Cambodia finally given a fighting chance for self-determination and stability, and after Vietnam has demonstrated that it is willing to be a responsible member of the Southeast Asian community, should Washington begin the process of normalization of relations with Hanoi.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much, and thank you for heeding the red light. I appreciate it.

Mr. Brown, as you note, our policy has been to provide financial support to the NCR through Thailand under the guise that ASEAN should "take the lead."

How much American involvement do you think it would take to turn the NCR into a critical democratic force?

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I do not think the United States by itself remotely could do that job. I think it must work through Thailand and through the ASEAN countries and, as I mentioned before, with the Cambodian-American and other expatriate Cambodian communities.

I do not think it is a job that we are really equipped to do directly in terms of working in the field, but there is a lot to be done on the international scene and on the diplomatic scene with our ASEAN colleagues.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you believe that the reports are accurate about forced repatriation of Cambodian refugees?

Mr. BROWN. From the Khmer Rouge camps into Khmer Rouge-held territory in Cambodia?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. I have seen the reporting on that in the media, and I frankly have no reason to doubt the reports that I have seen over the last year and a half or 2 years.

Senator CRANSTON. What do you believe to be the extent of corruption within the government, and is there any Hun Sen personal involvement?

Mr. BROWN. Of the PRK government?

Senator CRANSTON. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. I have no firsthand knowledge of that. My understanding of that comes from talking to people who have visited Cambodia recently, and I really cannot add anything to that on a personal basis.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you believe that under present circumstances the Hun Sen government will be able to stand off the Khmer Rouge?

Mr. BROWN. That is a big question. I think during the coming dry season you may see the loss of a number of border towns and border areas to both the Khmer Rouge forces and the non-Communist forces. Whether this will be 20 kilometers inside Cambodia or 100, I really cannot say.

My feeling is that the majority of the Cambodians, if they have a choice of engaging in a civil war and defending themselves against the possible return of the Khmer Rouge, are going to fight, be it within the militia organized by the PRK, or in the actual army.

Senator CRANSTON. An earlier witness, Mr. Pran, complained about the Khmer Rouge flag flying outside the U.N. for 14 years now, and that the highest ranking Khmer Rouge people, like, specifically Khieu Samphan, the chairman of the Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge, has been at the United Nations.

Could you explain just what our policy is toward the delegation that represents Kampuchea at the U.N. now? Who really controls that delegation?

Mr. BROWN. U.S. policy ever since 1979, and since the International Conference on Kampuchea under U.N. auspices, has been to follow ASEAN's policy. With regard to the delegation in New York, we have simply gone along with the procedures that are followed by that organization. It is very distasteful. We all recognize it is part of the long-term strategy, 10 years old now, to "keep the pressure" on Vietnam and on its surrogate government in Phnom Penh

to bring them to the negotiating table. It is a very distasteful policy to many of us, but when that decision was made in 1979 there seemed to be no other course.

Senator CRANSTON. Who really runs, or controls, whatever forces within that delegation of the U.N.?

Mr. BROWN. I am afraid I cannot answer that question. I do not know.

Mr. CONBOY. Mr. Chairman, there are three separate ambassadors up at the U.N.—one from Sihanouk, one from Son Sann, one from Khmer Rouge. They fight for a common goal, which has been to get the Vietnamese out. But just as on the battlefield they do not cooperate, you find oftentimes in New York there is not much cooperation—certainly not much on a personal level.

Senator CRANSTON. Are those three equal ambassadors?

Mr. CONBOY. Initially they were to be equal, but unfortunately, because of funding problems, which the United States and ASEAN were aware of, the Khmer Rouge maintained their funding from China and this far outweighed the funding that the other two non-Communist factions were able to get. As a result, it is my understanding that the Khmer Rouge ambassador has been able to call a lot of the shots and has been the most visible. However, there are the other two ambassadors that remain in New York.

Senator CRANSTON. Do you have any comments on that situation, Mr. Childress?

Mr. CHILDRESS. No, Mr. Chairman. The U.N. recognizes, of course, that seat being held where it is, I do not think you will find many people in the U.N., and certainly not including the United States, that endorses what that flag represents.

It is part of a long strategy and as Fred says it is distasteful in some senses but it is a necessary component at this point. The vacant seat formula, for instance, in a comprehensive settlement in moving that way makes sense. Prior to the kinds of cooperation needed from Hanoi, it makes sense to maintain the situation as we have.

Senator CRANSTON. Let me ask you another question, Mr. Childress. For years, recognition of Vietnam was made dependent only on unconditional withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia, but in the summer of 1988, a new condition arose in the context of a Cambodian peace settlement. Why was that new condition applied?

Mr. CHILDRESS. I have covered some of the reasons in my statement, Mr. Chairman. We started discussing, in fact, prior to the summer of 1988, witnessing the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the lack of a political solution among the parties, it clearly was not something that we felt we wanted to see repeated in Cambodia.

The attempt there was to let Vietnam know that a simple withdrawal would not be sufficient an end of itself, and we in fact wanted to work with them on a comprehensive settlement that would prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge and bring self-determination to the Cambodian people.

It to me represents a more sophisticated approach to the Vietnamese. In the past, when the formulation was initially made of strictly a withdrawal, I do not think that we anticipated the com-

plexities that we would face in terms of national reconciliation and Hanoi's influence over that.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Conboy, you mentioned that the Hun Sen government is drafting children, or very young people. Do you believe that the same thing is occurring on the part of Sihanouk and the KPNLF? There are reports to that effect.

Mr. CONBOY. There are of course going to be children in all three factions. I mentioned the Hun Sen faction and the Khmer Rouge faction particularly because it is very prevalent.

If you look at the KPNLF, they are in control of basically site 2, which is a border refugee camp, and if you look at its population it is the second largest Cambodian city in the world, after Phnom Penh. There is more than its share of able-bodied males in that camp, and when I mentioned just in my statement earlier that there has been a qualitative and quantitative improvement in the KPNLF in recent months, that is because they have been able to tap into this pool of able-bodied males.

So, while there is certainly going to be children in their forces as well, by and large you see in the two non-Communist factions an awful lot of people that do not fit in this category.

Senator CRANSTON. Thank you very much. I have no further questions. I think there may be other questions submitted in writing and perhaps I will have some to give to you from other members of the committee and myself.

I thank the three of you very much, and I thank all of our witnesses. I thank you all who have attended. Thank you for your interest and your presence.

We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

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